GIFT  OF 


The  Treaty  of  Washington,  Concluded 

August  9,  1842,  by  Daniel  Webster 

and  Lord  Ashburton 


HUGH    TAYLOR    GORDON 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 


The  Treaty  of  Washington,  Concluded 

August  9,  1842,  by  Daniel  Webster 

and  Lord  Ashburton 


THE  JAMES   BRYCE   HISTORICAL   PRIZE   ESSAY 
FOR    1907 


BY 
HUGH    TAYLOR   GORDON 


BERKELEY 

THE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 
1908 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

Introduction  1 

Part  I.     The  Causes  for  the  Treaty  3 

The  Boundary  Question,  its  Origin  and  History  3 

Frontier  disputes  20 

The  Question  of  the  Eight  of  Search  23 

The  "Creole"  and  the  "Caroline"  cases  25 

Part  II.     The  Making  of  the  Treaty 27 

The  Appointment  of  a  Special  Mission  29 

The  Negotiations  33 

Eatification  and  Acceptance  42 

Opposition  and  Criticism  45 

Part  III.     The  Effects  of  the  Treaty  53 

Immediate  and  Local  Effects  53 

Effects  on  International  Eelations:  Eight  of  Search  and  Ex 
tradition 56 

Appendices  62 

Bibliography  82 


THE    TREATY    OF    WASHINGTON,    CONCLUDED 

AUGUST  9,   1842,    BY   DANIEL   WEBSTER 

AND   LORD   ASHBURTON. 

HUGH  TAYLOR  GORDON. 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  Treaty  of  Washington  of  August  9th,  1842,  com 
monly  called  the  Webster- Ashburton  Treaty,  was  described 
by  Mr.  Webster,  himself,  as  * '  something  for  the  peace  of  the 
world."  The  whole  truth  of  this  characterization  was  not 
appreciated  at  the  time  it  was  spoken.  Webster  intended 
his  description  of  the  treaty  for  its  relation  to  past  events, 
for  its  results  in  settling  questions  which  had  actually  been 
verging  upon  war.  But  the  same  description  is  equally 
true  of  the  far-reaching  effects  of  the  treaty  in  its  subse 
quent  relation  to  international  law  and  the  fundamental 
principles  of  peace  between  nations. 

The  treaty  stands  between  two  long  periods  of  history, 
one  including  the  events  which  led  to  its  negotiation,  the 
other,  those  which  resulted  from  it.  In  its  relation  to  both 
of  these  periods  the  treaty  is  primarily  a  security  of  inter 
national  peace. 

The  long  history  of  the  Webster- Ashburton  treaty  be 
gins  with  the  boundary  question  originating  in  the  treaty 
of  1783.  Around  this  question  a  whole  series  of  compli 
cated  disputes  were  added  during  the  ten  years  preceding 


174  [2 

the  negotiation  of  the  treaty  in  1842.  It  was  the  unsettled 
boundary  which  magnified  the  real  importance  of  the  other 
disputes  and  brought  the  relations  of  the  United  States  and 
England  to  the  crisis  of  a  compromise  settlement  by  a  spe 
cial  mission. 

During  the  negotiations,  the  boundary  question  was  still 
the  strategic  point  in  dispute.  Its  settlement  involved  the 
concurrence  of  four  parties,  Maine  and  Massachusetts  be 
ing  added  to  the  two  national  governments,  and  although 
this  greatly  increased  its  difficulty,  the  adjustment  of  the 
different  claims  was  finally  accomplished.  The  boundaries 
being  settled,  the  success  of  the  negotiation  was  practically 
assured.  But  this  assurance  does  not  imply  that  no  other 
questions  of  importance  were  settled  by  the  treaty.  Two 
points,  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  and  extradition, 
were  included  in  its  provisions  and  both  of  these  held  a 
prominent  place  in  the  international  relations  subsequent  to 
the  treaty.  The  boundary  question  as  a  point  in  interna 
tional  relations  was  ended  by  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty ; 
while  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade  and  extradition 
were  fairly  launched  as  international  questions  by  the  same 
treaty.  It  is  in  this  way  that  the  treaty  marks  the  close  of 
one  period  of  historic  events  and  the  opening  of  another 
period  of  other  events.  Its  relation  to  both  is  that  of  a 
security  of  international  comity ;  ' '  something  for  the  peace 
of  the  world." 

In  the  writing  of  this  inquiry  into  the  history  of  the 
Webster-Ashburton  Treaty  the  attempt  has  been  made  to 
draw  upon  all  available  primary  sources  for  the  facts  of  the 
case.  Some  difficulty  has  been  encountered  in  this  regard 
chiefly  because  of  the  incompleteness  of  the  Congressional 
Records  on  the  shelves  of  the  University  of  California 
Library  for  the  period  between  1833  and  1841,  and  from 
an  almost  total  lack  of  English  documents  except  the  Par 
liamentary  Debates  and  an  occasional  collection  of  extracts. 
The  complete  private  and  diplomatic  correspondence  of 


3]  175 

Daniel  Webster,  drawn  from  several  sources,  has  been  val 
uable  in  tracing  the  course  of  the  negotiations  of  the  treaty, 
while  the  "Recueil  des  Arbitrages  International^ " — De 
Lapradelle  et  Politis,  furnished  a  good  working  basis  for 
the  history  of  the  boundary  question  up  to  the  Arbitration 
in  1831. 

In  arrangement,  the  inquiry  falls  naturally  into  three 
main  divisions,  which  correspond  with  distinct  periods  in  the 
history  of  the  treaty.  The  first  of  these,  concerning  the 
history  of  the  questions  which  led  to  the  treaty  of  1842, 
subdivides  into  two  sections,  which  deal  with  the  history  of 
the  boundary  question,  and  with  the  complicating  disputes 
which  arose  over  questions  of  national  policy.  The  second 
main  division  shows  the  culmination  of  the  disputed  ques 
tions  in  the  treaty  of  1842,  under  sections  dealing  with  the 
negotiations  preliminary  to  the  treaty,  the  making  of  the 
treaty,  and  its  ratification  and  acceptance  by  both  countries. 
In  the  final  part  of  the  inquiry  the  results  of  the  treaty  are 
taken  up  under  the  sub-headings  of  immediate  and  local 
results,  and  effects  upon  international  law  and  the  princi 
ples  of  peace  between  nations. 

I.     THE  CAUSES  FOE  THE  TEEATY. 

It  is  a  singular  piece  of  irony  that  the  boundary  stip 
ulations  of  the  treaty  of  1783,  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain,  which  were  proclaimed  by  their  framers 
for  the  particular  purpose  of  preventing  subsequent  dis 
putes,  were  the  very  source  and  material  of  the  longest  series 
of  boundary  disputes  the  United  States  has  ever  experi 
enced.  The  termination  of  this  much  agitated  boundary 
question  was  not  reached  until  1842,  when  Daniel  Webster 
and  Lord  Ashburton  compromised  for  its  settlement  by  a 
conventional  line.  To  understand  the  conditions  which 
contributed  to  its  final  settlement,  it  is  necessary  to  trace 
its  history  through  the  fifty-nine  years  which  elapsed  from 


176 


its  origin  in  1783  to  1842.  During  this  period  there  were 
many  attempts  made  to  solve  the  difficulties  which  arose 
from  the  second  article  of  the  treaty  of  1783,  describing  the 
boundaries  of  the  new  nation,  the  United  States  of  America. 
By  Jay's  treaty  in  1794  and  the  treaty  of  Ghent  in  1815, 
portions  of  the  boundary  were  settled.  But  the  remaining 
parts,  constituting  almost  the  entire  land  boundaries  be 
tween  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain's  North  Ameri 
can  provinces,  remained  disputed  in  spite  of  the  efforts  of 
commissioners,  diplomatists  and  arbitrators  to  secure  a  set 
tlement. 

By  the  second  article  of  the  treaty  of  peace  of  1783,  the 
northern  and  eastern  boundaries  of  the  United  States  are 
described  as  follows: 

' '  And  that  all  disputes  which  may  arise  in  the  future  on 
the  subject  of  the  boundaries  of  the  said  United  States  may 
be  prevented,  it  is  hereby  agreed  and  declared  that  the  fol 
lowing  are  and  shall  be  their  boundaries,  viz:  From  the 
northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia;  viz:  that  angle  which  is 
formed  by  a  line  drawn  due  north  from  the  source  of  the 
St.  Croix  River  to  the  Highlands ;  along  the  said  Highlands 
which  divide  those  rivers  that  empty  themselves  into  the 
river  Saint  Lawrence  from  those  which  fall  into  the  Atlan 
tic  Ocean,  to  the  northwesternmost  head  of  the  Connecticut 
River;  thence  down  along  the  middle  of  that  river  to  the 
forty-fifth  degree  of  north  latitude ;  from  thence,  by  a  line 
due  west  on  said  latitude,  until  it  strikes  the  river  Iroquois 
or  Cataraquy;  thence  along  the  middle  of  said  river  into 
Lake  Ontario,  through  the  middle  of  said  lake  until  it  strikes 
the  communication  by  water  between  that  lake  and  Lake 
Erie ;  thence  along  the  middle  of  said  communication  into 
Lake  Erie,  through  the  middle  of  said  lake  until  it  arrives  at 
the  water  communication  between  that  lake  and  Lake  Hu 
ron  ;  thence  through  the  middle  of  said  water  communication 
into  Lake  Huron ;  thence  through  the  middle  of  said  lake  to 
the  water  communication  between  that  lake  and  Lake  Super- 


5]  177 

ior;  thence  through  Lake  Superior,  northward  of  the  Isles 
Royal  and  Phelipeaux,  to  the  Long  Lake ;  thence  through  the 
middle  of  said  Long  Lake  and  the  water  communication  be 
tween  it  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  to  the  said  Lake  of  the 
Woods ;  thence  through  the  said  lake  to  the  most  northwest 
ern  point  thereof,  *  *  *  *.  East,  by  a  line  to  be 
drawn  along  the  middle  of  the  river  St.  Croix,  from  its 
mouth  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy  to  its  source,  and  from  its  source 
directly  north  to  the  aforesaid  Highlands,  which  divide  the 
rivers  that  fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean  from  those  which 
fall  into  the  River  St.  Lawrence;  comprehending  all  the 
islands  within  twenty  leagues  of  any  part  of  the  shores  of 
the  United  States,  and  lying  between  lines  to  be  drawn  due 
east  from  the  points  where  the  aforesaid  boundaries  between 
Nova  Scotia  on  the  one  part,  and  East  Florida  on  the  other, 
shall  respectively  touch  the  Bay  of  Fundy  and  the  Atlantic 
Ocean ;  excepting  such  islands  as  now  are,  or  heretofore  have 
been,  within  the  limits  of  the  province  of  Nova  Scotia. '  'J 

It  is  admitted  that  natural  boundaries  such  as  rivers, 
mountain  ranges  and  sea  coasts,  are  the  best  means  of  fixing 
political  boundaries  where  they  allow  the  desired  division 
of  territory  between  two  countries,  and  there  is  little  doubt 
that  this  was  the  aim  of  the  negotiators  who  laid  down  the 
boundaries  of  the  United  States  in  1783.  But  at  that  time 
the  country  through  which  the  boundary  lay  was  for  the 
most  part  wild  and  unsurveyed.  Consequently,  instead  of 
the  natural  objects  named  in  the  treaty  being  accurate  and 
unmistakable  definitions  of  the  boundary,  they  served  chief 
ly  to  raise  a  number  of  questions  as  to  the  identity  of  sig 
nificant  points  in  the  boundary.  It  is  to  this  fact  that  the 
boundary  disputes  rising  out  of  the  treaty  of  1783  are  due. 

The  first  of  these  was  in  regard  to  the  St.  Croix  River. 
The  treaty  had  identified  this  river  merely  as  having  its 
mouth  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy.  But  it  happened  that  there 


1  ' ( Treaties  and  conventions  between  U.  S.  and  other  powers  since 
July  4,  1776,"  p.  376.     John  H.  Haswell,  Compiler. 


178  [6 

were  several  streams  which  had  been  called  at  one  time  or 
another  the  St.  Croix  River  and  three  of  these  emptied  into 
the  Bay  of  Fundy.  Adverse  claims  were  set  up  by  the  two 
governments  as  to  which  of  these  was  intended.2  A  de 
tailed  history  of  this  particular  question  is  not  required  for 
our  purpose,  since  it  was  settled  by  the  treaty  of  November 
19,  1794,  commonly  known  as  Jay's  treaty.  It  is  important 
to  note,  however,  that  in  deciding  this  point,  not  only  the 
territory  immediately  between  the  two  streams  was  affected, 
but  the  position  of  the  boundary  formed  by  a  line  drawn 
due  north  from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  River  was  there 
by  determined.  Under  the  fifth  article  of  Jay 's  treaty  and 
an  explanatory  article  of  the  same,  added  in  1798,  a  com 
mission  definitely  identified  the  St.  Croix  River,  giving  the 
longitude  and  latitude  of  its  mouth  and  erecting  at  its  source 
a  monument  to  be  maintained  by  the  joint  measures  of  the 
two  governments.3  This  monument  was  made  the  starting 
point  of  all  subsequent  attempts  to  trace  the  unsettled 
boundary. 

Another  difference  had  arisen  about  the  same  time  that 
the  commissioners  were  investigating  the  identity  of  the  St. 
Croix,  prior  to  the  negotiations  of  1794,  but  its  settlement 
was  not  included  in  that  treaty.4  It  concerned  the  course 
of  the  boundary  among  the  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Passamr,- 
quoddy  at  the  mouth  of  the  St.  Croix.  and  the  ownership  of 
the  large  island  of  Grand  Menan  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy. 
Upon  this  point  the  treaty  of  1783  had  been  very  indefinite, 
merely  stating  that  the  line  should  be  drawn  due  east  from 
the  mouth  of  the  St.  Croix  and  should  include  within  the 
United  States  all  the  islands  within  twenty  leagues  of  the 
mainland  that  were  not,  and  had  not  been,  hitherto,  under 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  province  of  Nova  Scotia.  But  Nova 


2  Message  of  the  President,  Feb.  9,  1790,  with  correspondence  and 
papers  relating  to  the  northeast  boundary.     American  State  Papers, 
Foreign  Eelations.     Vol.  I.,  pp.  91-99. 

3  Treaties  and  Conventions,  J.  H.  Haswell,  pp.  382,  396. 

4  American  State  Papers,  F.  E.,  Vol.  I.,  pp.  91,  99. 


7]  179 

Scotia  claimed  jurisdiction  over  all  the  islands  in  the  Bay 
of  Fundy,  which  was  more  than  the  United  States  was  will 
ing  to  concede,  especially  since  the  American  town  of  East- 
port  was  situated  on  one  of  them.  Settlement  of  this  ques 
tion  was  again  deferred  by  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  ne 
gotiated  by  King  and  Hawkesbury  in  1803,  which  contained 
an  article  denning  this  portion  of  the  boundary.  Before  any 
further  negotiation  resulted,  other  events  intervened  to  take 
the  attention  of  both  countries  from  this  quarter. 

With  the  return  of  peace  after  the  war  of  1812,  another 
attempt  was  made  to  settle  the  boundary  question.  Articles 
four  to  eight,  inclusive,  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  provided 
for  the  appointment  of  commissioners  to  decide  upon  the 
ownership  of  the  islands  in  the  Bay  of  Fundy,  and  to  sur 
vey  and  determine  the  entire  boundary  from  the  source  of 
the  St.  Croix  river  to  the  northwesternmost  point  of  the 
Lake  of  the  Woods,  in  conformity  with  the  provisions  of  the 
treaty  of  1783. 5  The  work  was  divided  among  four  com 
missions.  The  first  of  these,  as  provided  in  the  fourth  ar 
ticle,  was  to  decide  upon  the  ownership  of  the  islands  near 
the  mouth  of  the  St.  Croix.  Article  five  allotted  to  another 
commission  the  determination  of  the  boundary  from  the 
head  of  the  St.  Croix  to  the  intersection  of  the  line  of  the 
forty-fifth  parallel  with  the  St.  Lawrence.  Article  six  pro 
vided  for  two  more  commissioners  to  run  the  boundary  from 
the  last  named  point  on  the  St.  Lawrence  to  the  outlet  of 
Lake  Superior,  and  having  completed  that  work,  the  same 
commissioners  were  authorized  by  article  seven  to  continue 
the  line  from  the  outlet  of  Lake  Superior  to  the  northwest 
point  in  the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  It  was  further  stipulated 
that  should  the  commissioners  fail  to  agree  in  any  case, 
statements  of  their  points  of  difference  and  the  grounds 
for  their  disagreement  should  be  referred  to  some  friendly 
Sovereign  or  State  for  arbitration. 


s  Treaties  and  Conventions,  J.  H.  Haswell,  p.  399. 


180  [8 

The  commissioners  appointed  under  the  fourth  article, 
declared  their  work  successfully  completed,  and  delivered 
their  decision  November  24,  1817.  They  awarded  to  the 
United  States  Moose  Island,  Dudley  Island  and  Frederick 
Island.  Great  Britain  received  all  other  islands  in  the  Bay 
of  Passamaquoddy,  also  the  large  island,  Grand  Menan,  in 
the  Bay  of  Fundy  proper. 

The  commissioners  of  article  six  accomplished  the  settle 
ment  of  the  boundary  described  in  that  article,  i.e.,  from 
the  intersection  of  the  line  of  the  forty-fifth  parallel  with 
the  St.  Lawrence  to  the  outlet  of  Lake  Superior.  But 
when  they  attempted  to  continue  this  line  westward  into 
and  through  Lake  Superior  and  the  water  communications 
to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods,  they  were  unable  to  reach  an 
agreement.  Two  points  of  difference  wTere  encountered. 
The  first  was  in  regard  to  which  channel  should  be  fol 
lowed  around  St.  George's  Island,  or  Sugar  Island,  situated 
in  the  water  communication  between  Lake  Huron  and  Lake 
Superior.  The  ownership  of  this  island  was  involved,  and 
as  it  was  of  considerable  extent  and  value,  neither  side 
would  make  the  concession.  The  second  question  was  as  to 
the  course  of  the  boundary  from  Lake  Superior  to  the  Lake 
of  the  Woods.  The  treaty  of  1783  had  said  it  should  go  by 
way  of  Long  Lake,  but  the  commissioners  differed  as  to  the 
exact  location  of  Long  Lake,  as  intended  by  the  negotiators 
of  the  treaty  of  1783.  The  American  Commissioners  main 
tained  that  the  most  northern  route  was  intended ;  going  by 
way  of  Dog  River  and  Sturgeon  Lake  to  Lac  la  Pluie,  and 
from  there  to  Lake  of  the  Woods.  The  English  Commis 
sioners  claimed  the  line  should  run  to  the  most  southwestern 
point  of  Lake  Superior  and  from  there  reach  Lac  la  Pluie 
by  Fond  du  Lac  and  the  St.  Louis  River.  The  two  lines 
agreed  from  Lac  la  Pluie  to  Lake  of  the  Woods.  Neither 
of  the  commissioners  would  relinquish  his  claim,  so  the 
whole  attempt  to  fix  the  boundary  from  the  outlet  of  Lake 
Superior  to  the  Lake  of  the  Woods  came  to  nothing. 


9]  181 

The  most  difficult  part  of  all  the  boundary  fell  to  the 
commissioners  under  the  fifth  article.  This  was  that  por 
tion  lying  between  the  monument  at  the  source  of  the  St. 
Croix  River  and  the  point  where  the  forty-fifth  parallel 
intersects  the  St.  Lawrence  at  St.  Regis.  As  defined  by  the 
treaty  of  1783,  this  part  of  the  boundary  was  to  be  deter 
mined  by  a  line  extending  due  north  from  the  source  of 
the  St.  Croix  to  its  intersection  with  the  Highlands  which 
formed  with  that  line  the  ' '  northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia. ' ' 
Furthermore,  these  Highlands  were  defined  as  "those  which 
divide  those  rivers  which  empty  themselves  into  the  river 
St.  Lawrence,  from  those  which  fall  into  the  Atlantic 
Ocean."  Along  their  crest  the  line  was  to  run  until  the 
northwesternmost  head  of  the  Connecticut  River  was 
reached;  whence  it  followed  the  middle  of  that  stream  to 
the  forty-fifth  degree  of  north  latitude,  and  from  that  point 
extended  along  the  line  of  the  forty-fifth  parallel  to  the 
St.  Lawrence.  The  treaty  of  1783  had,  as  we  have  already 
observed,  defined  a  boundary  through  an  unsurveyed  coun 
try  by  naming  rivers  and  heights  of  uncertain  location. 
This  was  a  fault  particularly  applicable  to  the  Highland 
frontier  just  described.  The  northwest  angle  of  Nova 
Scotia  had  never  been  accurately  defined  before  the  treaty 
of  1783,  nor  was  it  known  at  that  time  just  where  a  due 
north  line  from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  would  strike  the 
Highlands.  Consequently  when  the  commissioners  of  the 
fifth  article  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent  started  to  run  the  line 
from  the  head  of  the  St.  Croix  to  the  St.  Lawrence,  the 
first  question  they  encountered  was  that  of  determining  the 
point  where  the  due  north  line  strikes  the  Highlands  to 
form  the  northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia.  With  nothing 
in  the  treaty  of  1783 — which  they  were  trying  to  interpret 
—to  prove  this  point,  they  were  involved  in  the  territorial 
history  of  Massachusetts,  Canada,  and  Nova  Scotia,  and 
each  decided  on  a  different  point  to  which  the  north  line 
should  be  run. 


182  [10 

The  United  States  commissioner  claimed  the  Highlands 
named  in  the  treaty  were  those  which  the  due  north  line 
encountered  near  the  source  of  the  Metis,  a  small  tributary 
of  the  St.  Lawrence,  and  separated  its  waters  from  the 
headwaters  of  the  Ristagouche  and  the  St.  John.  The 
boundary,  if  it  followed  the  crest  of  the  Highlands  from 
this  point,  gave  to  the  United  States  the  entire  territory 
drained  by  the  St.  John  and  its  tributaries.  It  also  inter 
cepted  the  roads  of  communication  between  Quebec  and 
Halifax,  and  brought  the  United  States  frontier  within  a 
few  miles  of  Montreal  and  the  St.  Lawrence.  This  consid 
eration  was  much  more  important  to  England  than  the  loss 
o£  the  territory  for  its  agricultural  value.  It  was  not  diffi 
cult  to  find  a  valid  objection  to  such  an  interpretation  of 
the  treaty  of  1783.  The  Highlands  were  first  mentioned  in 
the  treaty  between  France  and  England  in  1763,  when  they 
were  described  as  those  "which  divide  the  rivers  which 
empty  themselves  into  the  river  St.  Lawrence  from  those 
which  fall  into  the  Sea. ' '  They  were  similarly  described  in 
the  Proclamation  creating  the  Province  of  Quebec  in  1763 
and  in  the  Quebec  act  of  1774,6  but  in  1783  instead  of  "the 
sea,"  "the  Atlantic  Ocean"  was  named.  Otherwise  the 
two  descriptions  coincided.  But  in  this  difference,  the 
English  saw  more  than  a  difference  between  controvertible 
terms.  They  contended  that  "the  sea"  was  a  general  term 
including  all  the  bays  and  gulfs  along  the  shore,  but  when 
"Atlantic  Ocean"  was  specified,  it  was  clearly  intended  by 
the  negotiators  to  express  a  distinction  between  the  open 
seacoast  and  a  gulf  or  bay.  Hence  any  Highlands  which 
divided  streams  flowing  into  the  Bay  of  Chaleurs  or  the 
Bay  of  Fundy  were  not  within  the  meaning  of  the  words 
of  the  treaty.  This  was  their  ground  of  objection  to  the 
American  claim. 

The  English  commissioner  contended  that  the  due  north 


e  Collections  of  the  Maine  Historical  Society ;  2nd  Ser.  Vol.  VIII, 
pp.  61,  64. 


11]  183 

line  was  never  intended  to  go  beyond  the  St.  John  River, 
but  should  terminate  at  Mars  Hill,  situated  about  midway 
between  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  and  the  intersection  of 
the  due  north  line  with  the  St.  John.  From  this  point  the 
boundary  was  run  westward  along  the  heights  separating 
the  headwaters  of  the  Aroostook  and  other  streams  flowing 
northward  into  the  St.  John  from  the  sources  of  the  Pen- 
nobseot,  flowing  southward  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  This 
line  struck  the  Highlands,  followed  by  the  American  com 
missioner,  at  Metamarjette  Portage,  the  two  lines  concur 
ring  from  that  point  to  the  northwest  source  of  the 
Connecticut  River.  The  objections  which  the  American 
commissioner  raised  to  this  line  were  quite  as  valid  as  those 
raised  by  the  English  against  the  United  States'  claim. 
Instead  of  separating  the  waters  of  the  St.  Lawrence  from 
those  of  the  Atlantic,  the  Highlands  claimed  by  the  English 
divided  streams  flowing  into  the  St.  John  from  those  empty 
ing  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  which  was  directly  contrary 
to  the  words  of  the  treaty.  Furthermore,  these  Highlands 
were  not  distinct  mountainous  ranges  like  those  north  of 
the  St.  John. 

Apparently  neither  side  presented  a  claim  which  com 
plied  strictly  with  the  words  of  the  treaty  of  1783.  But 
both  commissioners  insisted  that  their  claim  was  entirely 
just  and  in  accord  with  the  intentions  of  the  negotiators. 
There  was  no  alternative  but  to  abandon  this  attempt  to 
settle  the  boundary.  The  commissioners,  Thomas  Barclay 
for  England  and  Van  Ness  for  the  United  States,  an 
nounced  their  failure  to  their  respective  governments,  Oc 
tober  9,  1821. 7  Besides  the  boundary  dispute  on  the  ques 
tion  of  the  Highlands,  two  questions  of  minor  importance 
remained  unsettled.  In  regard  to  the  northwesternmost 
head  of  the  Connecticut,  the  American  commissioner 
claimed  Indian  Stream,  supposed  to  be  the  most  westerly 


7  De  Lapradelle  et  Politis,  ' '  Kecueil  des  Arbitrages  Internation- 
aux,"  p.  355. 


184  [12 

of  the  four  confluents  forming  the  sources  of  the  Connec 
ticut.  The  English  claim  was  for  the  western  source  of 
Connecticut  Lake,  a  part  of  the  headwaters  of  the  most 
easterly  of  the  four  confluents,  which  they  said  was  the 
northwesternmost  head  of  the  Connecticut  proper.  The 
difference  between  the  two  claims  here  affected  the  owner 
ship  of  a  considerable  tract  of  very  fertile  land  lying  along 
these  streams.  The  second  of  the  questions  arose  from  the 
discovery,  by  an  accurate  survey  in  1818,  that  the  line  of 
the  forty-fifth  parallel  as  it  had  been  generally  accepted 
since  the  survey  of  Valentine  and  Collins,  1764- '67,  as  the 
northern  boundary  of  New  York  and  Vermont,  was  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  north  of  the  true  line  of  the  forty-fifth 
parallel,  where  that  line  intercepted  the  Connecticut  River. 
The  two  lines  converged  as  they  approached  the  St.  Law 
rence,  including  a  long,  narrow  strip  of  territory  across 
the  northern  end  of  New  York  and  Vermont.  The  English 
commissioner  claimed  that  the  true  line  should  be  adopted, 
while  the  American  held  that  the  old  line  was  well  recog 
nized  as  the  boundary  and  should  be  confirmed.  An  im 
portant  feature  of  this  question  was  that  it  affected  the 
ownership  of  Rouse's  Point,  a  military  position  command 
ing  the  entrance  of  Lake  Champlain,  situated  between  the 
two  lines,  and  hitherto  supposed  to  belong  to  the  United 
States. 

The  result  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent  came  far  short  of 
settling  the  boundary.  The  portions  allotted  to  the  com 
missioners  under  articles  four  and  six  had  been  determined, 
but  the  part  described  by  articles  five  and  seven,  greater 
both  in  extent  of  boundary  and  difficulty  of  settlement, 
remained  in  dispute.  The  provisions  in  the  treaty  for 
arbitration  offered  no  immediate  solution  of  the  difficulties, 
since  nothing  in  the  way  of  a  definite  set  of  rules  was  laid 
down  by  which  the  questions  could  be  fairly  presented  to 
an  arbiter.8  Until  such  necessary  rules  were  agreed  upon, 


s  De  Lapradelle  et  Politis,  ' '  Eecueil  des  Arbitrages  Internation- 
aux,"  p.  356. 


13]  185 

the  declaration  of  the  treaty  that  the  questions  should  be 
referred  to  a  friendly  sovereign  were  wholly  ineffective. 

From  1821  to  1826  there  was  a  lull  in  the  boundary 
proceedings  as  far  as  any  national  action  was  concerned. 
Neither  side  made  a  move  toward  negotiating  for  settle 
ment.  But  in  1826  active  interest  of  the  national  govern 
ments  was  again  aroused  by  the  disturbances  in  the  disputed 
territory,  resulting  from  friction  between  the  local  author 
ities  of  the  two  governments.  The  disputed  frontier  had 
been  for  the  most  part  unoccupied  and  practically  unheeded 
until  about  1825,  when  pioneer  settlers  began  to  take  up 
the  land  for  homesteads  and  to  cut  into  the  resourceful 
forests  of  the  disputed  territory.9  Then  complaints,  increas 
ing  in  number  and  urgency,  began  to  be  sent  to  the  author 
ities,  both  local  and  national,  that  encroachments  upon  the 
rights  of  the  State  were  being  made  by  subjects  of  the  other 
government.  Mr.  C.  R.  Vaughan,  the  British  minister  at 
Washington,  informed  his  government  in  March,  1827,  that 
the  American  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Clay,  had  promised 
to  restrain  Maine  and  Massachusetts  from  further  encroach 
ments  into  the  disputed  territory.10  The  Governor  of 
Maine  soon  afterwards  issued  a  proclamation  in  which  he 
forbade  the  citizens  of  the  State  from  taking  any  independ 
ent  action  regarding  encroachments,  but  urged  them  to  rely 
on  the  authority  of  the  State  for  the  preservation  of  peace. 
But  in  spite  of  these  measures,  timber  cutting  and  settling 
continued  in  the  disputed  territory  and  the  complaints 
against  encroachments  grew.  This  fact  is  well  shown  by 
the  correspondence  between  Mr.  Vaughan  and  Sir  Howard 
Douglas,  the  Governor  of  New  Brunswick,11  and  by  the 


»  American  Historical  Review.     Vol.  VII.   (1901-02),  p.  500. 

10  Vaughan  to  Canning.     March,   1827.     American  Historical  Re 
view,  Vol.  VII,  p.  500.     Maine  was  separated  from  Massachusetts  and 
admitted  as  a  State,  1819-20.     But  much  of  the  unclaimed  land  in  the 
disputed  territory  was  still  held  by  them  under  an  arrangement  of 
joint  ownership.     Maine  Historical  Ass'n.,  Vol.  VIII,  pp.  135,  196. 

11  American  Historical  Review,  Vol.  VII,  p.  500. 


186  [14 

emphatic  resolutions  of  the  Maine  Legislature,  passed  Feb 
ruary  18,  1828,  in  which  the  Governor  was  requested  to  use 
his  power  to  stop  new  aggressions  if  they  were  not  pre 
vented  by  the  national  government.12  The  conditions  on 
the  frontier  clearly  demanded  that  an  early  attempt  be 
made  to  settle  the  question  of  jurisdiction  over  the  disputed 
territory.  Albert  Gallatin  was  intrusted  with  the  work  of 
negotiating  a  settlement  of  the  boundary  question,  and  to 
this  end  was  appointed  minister  to  England  and  empowered 
to  treat  for  and  sign  a  convention  for  the  United  States 
with  England  on  this  subject.  It  was  hoped  by  Gallatin 
that  a  settlement  could  be  successfully  made  by  direct 
negotiations  writh  the  English  ministry,  but  this  hope  was 
doomed  to  failure.  Both  parties  remained  obdurate  in  their 
claims  based  upon  divergent  interpretations  of  the  treaty 
of  1783.  After  several  weeks  of  unsuccessful  conferences, 
Gallatin  was  obliged  to  submit  to  a  recourse  to  arbitration 
which  was  taken  as  the  last  means  of  bridging  the  dif 
ficulty.13 

"A  convention  providing  for  the  arbitration  of  the  dis 
pute  concerning  the  Northeastern  Boundary"  was  con 
cluded,  September  29,  1827,  by  the  negotiators,  Albert  Gal 
latin  for  the  United  States,  and  Charles  Grant  and  Henry 
Unwin  Addington  for  England.  Ratifications  were  ex 
changed  April  2,  1828,  and  the  convention  proclaimed  May 
15,  1828.  This  convention  framed  the  rules  for  arbitration 
which  had  not  been  provided  by  the  treaty  of  Ghent  and 
agreed  that  the  differences  which  had  arisen  under  the  fifth 
article  of  that  treaty  should  be  submitted  to  the  decision 
of  a  friendly  Sovereign  or  State.  Each  side  was  allowed 
to  prepare  a  statement  of  their  claims  and  a  counter  state 
ment  to  the  points  offered  by  the  opposing  side.  Upon 
these  statements  and  such  other  necessary  topographical 


12  Maine  Historical  Society,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  270. 

is  Gallatin  to  J.  Brown,  U.  S.  Minister  at  Paris,  February  2,  1827. 
Gallatin  'a  Writings,  II,  p.  360. 


15]  187 

evidence,  maps  and  surveys  as  the  contracting  parties  mu 
tually  supplied,  the  arbiter  was  to  decide  for  the  claims  of 
one  or  the  other.  His  decision,  to  be  given  if  possible 
within  two  years  after  he  consented  to  act.  should  be  final 
and  binding  upon  both  parties. 

In  drawing  up  their  statements,  the  claims  of  the  com 
missioners  of  the  fifth  article  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent  were 
reaffirmed  in  all  but  one  particular.  The  American  claim 
regarding  the  northwesternmost  head  of  the  Connecticut 
Kiver  was  changed  from  Indian  Stream  to  Hall's  Stream, 
since  discovered  to  be  the  most  westerly  of  the  four  con 
fluents.  The  statements  were  full  and  complete,  each  side 
contending  to  prove  that  its  claim  met  the  intentions  of  the 
negotiators  of  1783.  England's  statement  was  drawn  up 
by  the  foreign  office,  while  that  of  the  United  States  was 
prepared  by  Albert  Gallatin,  assisted  by  Mr.  W.  P.  Preble, 
a  Maine  man,  then  United  States  Minister  at  the  Hague. 

The  arbiter  chosen  was  William  I,  King  of  the  Nether 
lands,  and  his  decision  was  announced  January  10,  1831, 14 
through  the  United  States  Minister  at  the  Hague,  Mr. 
Preble.  This  decision,  known  as  the  * '  Dutch  Award, ' '  now 
became  the  center  of  interest  between  the  two  countries. 
Upon  two  of  the  points  submitted,  the  northwest  source  of 
the  Connecticut  and  the  line  of  the  forty-fifth  parallel, 
England's  claim  was  upheld,  with  the  special  provision  that 
Eouse's  point  should  belong  to  the  United  States.  But  on 
the  question  of  the  Highlands  and  the  northwest  angle  of 
Nova  Scotia,  the  arbiter  decided  that  the  claim  of  neither 
party  could  be  taken  as  a  just  and  true  interpretation  of 
the  treaty  of  1783.  The  boundary,  he  said,  could  not  be 
determined  by  its  description  in  that  treaty.  Hence  he 
recommended  a  middle  line  which  would  give  an  equitable 
division  of  the  disputed  territory.  The  due  north  line  from 
the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  was  terminated  at  the  St.  John 


i*  De  Lapradelle  et  Politis,  ' '  Recueil  des  Arbitrages  Internation- 
aux"     .  361. 


188  [16 

and  from  there  the  boundary  followed  the  middle  of  that 
stream  to  the  source  of  the  St.  Francis,  whence  the  High 
land  boundary  was  unmistakable.  In  making  this  decision 
the  arbiter  gave  what  he  considered  a  fair  settlement  of 
the  dispute.  England  gained  enough  of  the  disputed  ter 
ritory  to  insure  her  communications  between  the  Provinces 
of  New  Brunswick  and  Canada,  while  the  United  States 
retained  a  strong  military  frontier  along  the  Highlands,  as 
well  as  Rouse's  Point  at  the  entrance  of  Lake  Champlain. 
In  value  of  territory,  the  gains  of  Great  Britain  at  the 
source  of  the  Connecticut  and  along  the  forty-fifth  parallel 
wrere  counterbalanced  by  awarding  to  the  United  States  the 
fertile  valleys  of  the  Aroostook  and  Allegash,  the  country 
north  of  the  St.  John  being  very  rugged  and  of  little  agri 
cultural  value. 

Mr.  Preble  sent  the  award  to  England,  January  12, 
1831,  and  with  it  a  "respectful  protest  against  a  decision 
which  had  exceeded  its  authority  in  giving  an  opinion  in 
stead  of  a  judgment."  The  grounds  for  this  protest  were, 
that  the  arbiter  had  not  been  authorized  by  the  rules  of 
1827  to  mediate  between  the  claims,  but  to  decide  abso 
lutely  for  one  or  the  other.  This  had  not  been  done  in 
regard  to  the  northwest  angle  of  Nova  Scotia  and  the  High 
lands.  The  British  ministry,  nevertheless,  disregarded 
Preble 's  protest,  which  was  not  made  under  any  instruc 
tions  from  his  government,  and  announced  that  it  would 
accept  the  award  as  had  been  agreed  in  the  convention.15 

In  the  United  States  the  award  met  a  strong  opposition. 
Maine  in  particular  strenuously  protested  its  acceptance  by 
the  federal  government.  A  joint  select  committee  of  its 
legislature,  consisting  of  four  senators  and  seven  repre 
sentatives,  recommended  resolutions  which  were  adopted  by 
the  state  legislature,  January  19,  1832,  which  declared, 
that  it  was  not  within  the  constitutional  power  of  the  fed 
eral  government  to  cede  to  a  foreign  power  any  portion  of 

is  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  series,  Vol.  67,  pp.  1171,  1175. 


17]  189 

a  state's  territory  without  its  consent;  that  the  decision 
was  not  obligatory  on  the  parties  of  the  arbitration  agree 
ment,  and  that  inasmuch  as  the  adoption  of  the  new  line 
was  regarded  as  a  violation  of  the  rights  of  Maine,  a  formal 
protest  was  made  against  it.  These  resolves  were  communi 
cated  to  Congress  and  the  President,  and  the  Representa 
tives  of  the  State  in  Congress  were  instructed  to  prevent  if 
possible  the  adoption  of  the  award.  The  cooperation  of 
Massachusetts  was  solicited  and  on  February  15  the  general 
court  of  the  legislature  of  that  state  passed  concurrent  reso 
lutions  for  the  rejection  of  the  award. 

The  question  was  referred  to  the  Senate  by  the  Presi 
dent  on  December  7,  1831,  and  shortly  afterwards  Eng 
land 's  decision  to  accept  the  award  was  officially  announced. 
After  a  lengthy  debate  in  secret  session,  the  Senate  voted 
in  June,  1832,  to  reject  the  arbiter's  decision,  and  to  re 
open  negotiations  with  England  for  determining  the  boun 
dary  according  to  the  treaty  of  1783. 16  The  vote  was 
decisive:  thirty-five  for  rejection  against  eight  for  accept 
ance.  Maine's  absolute  stand  against  the  award  was  the 
chief  cause  for  the  refusal  of  the  federal  government  to 
accept  it.  President  Jackson  was  inclined  to  accept  the 
arbiter's  decision,  in  which  he  saw  the  solution  of  a  long 
standing  and  sore  difficulty.17  But  the  protests  of  Maine 
and  Massachusetts  could  not  be  legally  over-ridden,  since 
it  is  not  possible  under  the  constitution  to  change  the  boun 
daries  of  a  state  against  its  will,  except  by  treaty.  The 
refusal  of  the  award  by  the  United  States  was  announced 
to  the  British  Minister  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  July  31, 
1832. 

England  refused  to  consider  the  vote  of  the  Senate  as 
a  final  rejection  of  the  award,  but  for  three  years  con 
tinued  to  insist  on  its  acceptance  by  the  United  States. 


is  Congressional  Debates,  Vol.  VIII,  Part  I,  p.  1395. 
IT  Curtis,  "Life  of  Webster,"  II,  p.  139;  also  N.  A.  Keview,  Vol. 
LV  (1843),  p.  461. 


190  [18 

Palmerston  declared  that  even  though  the  arbiter's  opinion 
upon  the  Highlands  was  purely  deliberative,  the  United 
States  could  not  rightfully  repudiate  the  other  parts  of  the 
decision.18  Sir  Charles  R.  Vaughan  also  stoutly  defended 
the  award.  His  dispatches  to  the  home  government  through 
the  year  1833  express  his  firm  belief  that  the  way  to  settle 
the  boundary  question  was  to  induce  the  United  States  to 
accept  the  award.  He  also  suggested  that  once  this  was 
done,  England  could,  by  negotiation  and  equivalents,  re 
move  the  American  jurisdiction  from  the  territory  north  of 
the  St.  John.19  Nothing  was  accomplished,  however,  to 
ward  a  reconsideration  of  the  award  by  the  Senate.  Eng 
land  finally  gave  up  the  attempt  and  declared  herself  no 
longer  bound  by  her  offer  to  accept  the  arbiter's  decision.20 
From  1833  to  1841  the  boundary  question  was  juggled 
back  and  forth  between  the  two  countries  in  a  series  of 
projects  and  counter-projects  in  which  neither  side  could 
agree  to  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  other.  Soon  after 
the  rejection  of  the  award  the  United  States  proposed  that 
a  joint  commission  be  appointed  to  survey  the  line  and  de 
termine  the  Highlands  named  in  1783.  England  reluctantly 
consented  to  this  proposal.  A  draught  of  convention  was 
drawn  up  and  sent  to  the  American  Secretary  of  State, 
through  the  English  Minister,  Mr.  Fox.  But  when  this 
reached  Washington  the  United  States  had  decided  that  set 
tlement  could  only  be  obtained  by  arbitration,  recent  dis 
turbances  in  Maine  having  shown  the  improbability  of  set 
tlement  by  a  survey  commission.  They  accordingly  re 
turned  a  counter  proposal,  that  a  commission  of  six  be 
chosen  for  the  survey  and  arbitration  of  the  boundary. 
England  accepted  the  main  features  of  this  proposal,  but 
absolutely  refused  to  consent  to  the  added  conditions,  that 


is  De  Lapradelle  et  Politis,  "Kecueil  des  Arbitrages  Internation- 
aux,"  p.  282. 

19  Vaughan  to  Viscount  Goderich,  Feb.   7,   1833.     American  His 
torical  Eeview,  VII,  p.  504. 

20  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  67,  p.  1175. 


19]  191 

Mitchell's  Map  should  be  acknowledged  by  the  commission 
as  the  authentic  map  of  the  country,  and  that  agents  of  the 
two  governments  should  accompany  the  survey  commission 
to  furnish  explanations  on  behalf  of  their  respective  gov 
ernments.  Her  objections  were  expressed  in  the  preamble  of 
a  new  draft  for  a  convention,  communicated  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  State  by  Mr.  Fox,  July  28,  1840.21  The  United 
States'  reply  to  this  was  another  counter-project,  delivered 
August  13,  1840.  Palmerston  said  in  his  letter  to  Fox,  of 
August  24,  1841,  that  this  "contained  so  many  inadmiss 
ible  propositions"  that  it  could  not  be  accepted.  To  this 
he  added  a  belief  that  no  settlement  could  be  hoped  for  dur 
ing  the  Presidency  of  Mr.  Van  Buren.22 

The  whole  course  of  the  negotiation  during  this  long 
period  of  projects  and  counter-projects  accomplished  noth 
ing  toward  an  actual  settlement.  It  did,  however,  impress 
upon  the  two  governments  the  necessity  of  abandoning  their 
attempts  to  fix  the  boundary  according  to  the  terms  of  the 
treaty  of  1783.  In  his  communication  to  Mr.  Forsyth  of 
January  10,  1838,  Mr.  Fox  proposed  a  conventional  line  as 
the  only  possible  settlement  of  the  dispute.23  Although  the 
United  States  continued  to  urge  further  attempts  to  trace 
the  line  in  conformity  with  the  treaty,  the  opinion  was  form 
ing  among  some  of  the  leading  men  of  the  country,  of  whom 
Daniel  Webster  was  one,  that  a  conventional  line  would 
have  to  be  agreed  upon. 

Meanwhile  survey  commissions  had  been  sent  out  by 
each  government  to  collect  data  and  topographical  evidence 
concerning  the  disputed  territory.  England  sent  two  com 
missions,  one  in  1839  conducted  by  Colonel  Mudge  and  Mr. 
Featherstonhaugh,  and  another  in  1840  under  Mr.  Brough- 
ton  and  Mr.  Featherstonhaugh,  Jr.  The  reports  of  these 
commissions  were  intended  to  furnish  additional  proofs  for 


21  Senate  Document,  No.  274,  27th  Cong.,  1st  Sess. 

22  Parliamentary  Debates,  3d  Series,  Vol.  67,  p.  1233. 

23  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  67,  p.  1229. 


192  [20 

England's  claim  in  case  another  convention  was  agreed 
upon.  Similarly  the  United  States  sent  surveyors  into  the 
disputed  territory  in  the  summers  of  1840  and  1841,  to 
verify  by  their  reports  the  American  claim  for  the  High 
lands  north  of  the  St.  John.  Although  the  work  of  these 
commissions  was  ex  parte,  the  two  governments  informed 
one  another  of  their  intention  to  send  surveyors  into  the 
territory  and  even  communicated  the  reports  of  the  com 
missions,  so  that  a  partial  step  was  taken  in  the  direction  of 
mutual  action,  in  spite  of  their  disagreements  in  making 
drafts  for  a  convention.24 

While  the  foreign  secretaries  of  both  governments  were 
exchanging  views  on  framing  a  convention  for  settling  the 
question,  and  surveyors  were  making  maps  of  the  disputed 
territory,  affairs  on  the  boundary  were  becoming  more  and 
more  critical.  The  disputes  resulting  from  an  unsettled 
frontier  were  taking  on  a  very  threatening  aspect.  It  had 
been  agreed  by  the  parties  when  the  question  was  submitted 
to  arbitration  that  any  attempts  on  either  side  to  exercise 
jurisdiction  over  the  disputed  territory  should  be  sus 
pended.  But,  whether  from  inability  or  unwillingness — 
probably  the  latter, — the  local  authorities  did  not  stop  their 
citizens  from  coming  into  contact  in  the  disputed  territory. 
The  national  governments  showed  a  desire  to  settle  the 
question  peaceably  by  dividing  the  disputed  territory  if 
necessary,  but  the  authorities  of  Maine  and  New  Brunswick 
demanded  that  their  claims  be  upheld  to  the  full  extent.25 

The  disputes  on  the  Maine  boundary  centered  around 
the  settlement  of  Madawaska,  situated  on  both  sides  of  the 
St.  John  at  its  intersection  with  the  Madawaska  River.  It 
was  over  these  settlements  that  both  countries  claimed  juris 
diction  and  consequently  a  clash  of  authority  resulted.  In 


24  Corresp.  of  Fox  and  Forsyth,  Senate  Document  No.  274,  29th 
Cong.,  1st  Sess. 

25  Resolves  of  Maine  Legislature,  March  25,  1837,  in  "Messages 
and  Papers  of  the  Presidents."     J.  D.  Richardson,  Vol.  II,  pp.  349- 
357. 


21]  193 

1828,  John  Baker,  an  American  citizen,  had  been  arrested 
there  for  warning  the  inhabitants  against  the  exclusive 
authority  of  New  Brunswick,  and  was  convicted  of  seditious 
conspiracy  by  an  English  court,  for  which  he  was  forced 
to  pay  a  fine  and  serve  a  term  of  imprisonment,  although 
repeated  demands  were  made  by  the  United  States  for  his 
release.20  In  1837  more  Americans  were  arrested  for  try 
ing  to  hold  an  election  in  Madawaska  under  the  authority 
of  Penobscot  County.  Also  Greely,  a  census  agent  of 
Maine,  was  taken  into  custody  by  the  New  Brunswick 
authorities.  These  events  brought  forth  a  storm  of  protest 
in  Maine.  Her  legislature  passed  resolutions  demanding 
that  the  State's  rights  be  secured  and  her  citizens  protected 
by  the  federal  government.  The  prisoners  were  released, 
but  the  feeling  of  antagonism  remained.27  The  movement 
developed  into  what  was  known  as  the  ' '  Madawaska  War. ' ' 
Although  no  blood  was  shed,  both  sides  assumed  a  threat 
ening  attitude  and  organized  their  forces  for  military  occu 
pation  of  the  disputed  territory.  General  Scott  was  sent 
to  take  charge  of  the  United  States  forces  in  the  Canadian 
frontier  in  the  spring  of  1838  and  it  was  largely  due  to  his 
cool  direction  that  open  conflict  was  avoided.  He  made  a 
proposal  which  was  accepted  by  the  governors  of  Maine  and 
New  Brunswick,  whereby  it  was  mutually  agreed  to  let 
questions  of  possession  and  jurisdiction  over  the  disputed 
territory  stand,  each  government  exercising  its  jurisdiction 
over  a  certain  portion  of  the  territory  but  without  recog 
nition  of  its  right  to  do  so  by  the  other  side.28  Such  a 
policy  succeeded  in  pacifying  the  local  factions  for  a  short 
time.  Irresponsible  depredations  into  the  timber  by  law 
less  men  were  stopped  and  a  vigorous  military  police  was 
maintained  by  both  governments.  How  long  the  question 

26  Speech  of  Douglas,  former  Governor  of  New  Brunswick,  in  Par 
liamentary  Debates,  3rd  Ser.,  Vol.  67,  pp.  1270-73. 

27  Kichardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  Vol.   Ill, 
pp.  358,  368. 

28  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Ser.,  Vol.  53,  p.  1153. 


194  [22 

could  be  thus  kept  under  guard,  was  questionable.  The 
military  agreement  of  Scott  and  Harvey  was  really  a  tem 
porary  truce,  pending  the  settlement  which  it  was  hoped 
would  soon  be  reached  by  the  national  governments. 

The  border  disturbances  were  not  confined  to  the  fron 
tiers  of  Maine,  but  spread  along  the  entire  northern  boun 
dary.  Violations  of  neutrality,  not  even  thought  of  by  the 
framers  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  were  actually  begun  during 
a  Canadian  rebellion,  1837- '38.  American  adventurers, 
idlers,  and  worse,  helped  the  insurgents  to  aggravate  the 
Canadian  authorities.  Bands  of  "Patriots"  and  "Hunters' 
Lodges ' '  were  established  along  the  frontier  for  the  purpose 
of  assisting  the  rebels  in  what  they  declared  to  be  the  cause 
of  right  and  liberty.  Affairs  came  to  a  crisis  in  this  quarter 
with  the  destruction  of  the  steamer  "Caroline,"  an  Amer 
ican  vessel,  which  was  alleged  to  have  been  used  by  the 
sympathizers  to  carry  supplies  and  war  munitions  to  Navy 
Island,  where  the  rebels  were  located.  An  English  force 
was  sent  out  on  the  night  of  December  29,  1837,  to  destroy 
the  vessel,  but  found  her  moored  to  the  dock  on  the  Amer 
ican  shore,  instead  of  at  Navy  Island  as  they  had  expected. 
They  were  not  deterred,  however,  from  carrying  out  their 
plans,  but  seized  the  vessel  forcibly  and  towed  her  into  the 
current,  where  she  was  set  afire  and  allowed  to  drift  over 
Niagara  Falls.  At  least  one  American  was  killed  in  the 
affair,  and  several  were  more  or  less  injured.  The  indig 
nation  of  the  entire  country  was  roused  by  this  outrage. 
United  States  territory  had  been  violated  by  an  armed  force 
of  a  foreign  government.  This  was  more  than  a  local  dis 
pute  of  boundaries.  It  was  unmistakably  an  invasion  of 
United  States  territory,  a  fact  which  the  government  as 
well  as  the  people  resented.  On  the  frontier  things  were 
in  a  commotion  and  there  was  imminent  danger  of  the 
people  taking  summary  justice  by  a  resort  to  arms.  The 
national  government  took  immediate  steps  to  establish 
order  and  also  to  prevent  a  repetition  of  such  invasions. 


23]  195 

The  militia  were  called  into  service  under  the  command  of 
General  Scott,  and  a  formal  complaint  was  made  to  the 
British  government.29 

Under  this  vigorous  management  matters  became  more 
peaceable  in  1839.  General  Scott  did  much  to  end  the 
"Patriot"  movement  by  addressing  the  rebel  sympathizers 
upon  the  folly  and  danger  of  disturbing  the  international 
peace.30  Proclamations  by  the  President  urged  similar  for 
bearance  upon  the  citizens  of  the  United  States.31  The 
favorable  aspect  of  the  question  is  shown  in  the  President's 
third  annual  message  to  congress  issued  December  2,  1839. 32 
He  says  in  part :  * '  The  extraordinary  powers  vested  in  me 
by  the  act  of  Congress  for  the  defense  of  the  country  in  an 
emergency,  considered  so  far  probable  as  to  require  that 
the  Executive  should  possess  ample  means  to  meet  it,  have 
not  been  exerted.  *  *  *  Happily,  in  our  pending  ques 
tions  with  Great  Britain,  out  of  which  this  unusual  grant 
of  authority  arose,  nothing  has  occurred  to  require  its  ex 
ertion.  *  *  *  There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  the 
disturbances  like  those  which  lately  agitated  the  neighbor 
ing  British  Provinces  will  not  again  prove  the  sources  of 
border  contentions."  Prompt  and  judicious  action  by  the 
national  authorities  had  dispersed  any  immediate  danger 
of  conflict  on  the  frontier.  But  the  feeling  of  hostility  was 
only  suppressed  and  not  extinguished.  The  international 
questions  which  gave  rise  to  the  disturbances,  remained 
unsettled. 

In  1840  and  1841  more  difficulties  were  added  to  the 
disputes  already  pending,  which,  like  the  case  of  the  ' '  Caro 
line,"  involved  questions  of  international  law.  Foremost 


29  Kichardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  Vol.  Ill,  pp. 
401-404. 

30  Callahan,  J.   M.,   The  Neutrality  of   the  American  Lakes,   pp. 
100-101. 

si  U.  S.  Statutes  at  Large,  Vol.  XI,  pp.  784-785. 
32  Kichardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  Vol.   Ill, 
p.  529. 


196  [24 

among  these  was  the  question  of  Right  of  Search  or  Visit 
which  was  revived  at  this  time  by  the  action  of  British 
cruisers  engaged  in  suppressing  the  slave  trade  on  the 
African  Coast.  The  United  States  and  Great  Britain  had 
agreed  in  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  to  exercise  their  best  efforts 
to  end  the  traffic  in  slaves.  To  further  this  object,  a  treaty 
was  negotiated,  but  not  ratified,  during  the  second  admin 
istration  of  Mr.  Monroe,  allowing  a  mutual  right  of  visit  to 
be  exercised  by  the  cruisers  of  the  two  governments,  to 
ascertain  whether  ships  suspected  of  being  slavers  were  act 
ually  so  enga'ged.  Since  this  time  England  had  entered 
into  treaties  with  other  powers,  particularly  Portugal, 
Spain,  and  France,  for  the  exercise  of  a  right  of  visit,  but 
with  the  United  States  nothing  had  been  agreed  upon. 
Several  proposals  for  such  a  treaty  had  been  made  by  Eng 
land  from  1833  to  1838,  but  not  accepted.  This  question 
had  never  been  well  received  in  the  United  States  and  its 
significance  in  the  war  of  1812  was  not  yet  forgotten.  But 
in  the  spring  of  1840,  the  commanders  of  the  American  and 
British  fleets  on  the  coast  of  Africa  signed  an  agreement 
for  the  mutual  right  to  arrest  the  merchant  vessels  of  the 
United  States  and  England  and  her  allies,  found  to  be 
trading  in  slaves,  and  turn  them  over  to  their  own  govern 
ment's  authorities  for  adjudication.33  The  agreement  on 
the  part  of  the  American  Commander  was  unauthorized  by 
his  instructions  and  was  promptly  disavowed  by  the  home 
government.  But  during  the  interval  of  its  enforcement 
several  American  merchant  vessels  were  arrested  by  British 
cruisers  on  slender  suspicions  of  being  slavers,  causing  con 
siderable  loss  to  their  owners  from  the  interruption  of  the 
voyage.  The  complaints  received  by  the  national  govern 
ment  against  such  interference  with  innocent  commerce 
renewed  the  old  opposition  to  the  Right  of  Search,  even 
though  it  was  now,  as  England  claimed,  a  mere  Right  of 
Visit  to  ascertain  the  truth  of  a  vessel's  nationality.  Eng- 
ss  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers  (1848),  pp.  73-76. 


25]  197 

land  maintained  that,  treaty  or  no  treaty,  her  warships 
were  entitled  to  visit  a  merchant  vessel  on  the  high  seas  and 
see  the  proof  of  her  nationality.  It  was  asserted  that  this 
was  made  necessary  by  the  fact  that  vessels  of  various 
nationality  engaging  in  the  slave  trade,  sought  immunity 
by  falsely  assuming  the  flag  of  the  United  States.  True  as 
this  may  have  been,  the  United  States  stuck  to  the  prin 
ciple,  that  in  time  of  peace,  none  but  an  American  warship 
was  entitled  to  interrupt,  or  in  any  way  interfere  with  a 
merchant  vessel  flying  the  American  flag. 

England 's  zeal  to  abolish  slavery  raised  another  question 
of  maritime  rights,  in  which  the  case  of  the  "Creole" 
figured  most  prominently.34  The  "Creole"  was  an  Amer 
ican  vessel  whose  crew,  composed  of  negro  slaves,  had  mu 
tinied  and  forced  her  captain  to  sail  to  the  British  port  of 
Nassau  in  the  Bermudas.  While  in  that  port,  the  English 
authorities  declared  that  in  accord  with  the  laws  of  Eng 
land,  which  recognized  no  rights  of  slavery  within  English 
territorial  jurisdiction,  these  slaves  on  the  "Creole"  were 
no  longer  bound  to  their  masters.  Similar  action  was  taken 
by  the  port  authorities  with  slaves  on  board  other  American 
vessels  driven  to  the  refuge  of  the  English  port  by  stress 
of  weather.  The  loss  of  valuable  slave  property,  thus  forced 
upon  the  American  owners,  raised  a  strong  protest  in  the 
United  States,  particularly  in  the  South  where  the  question 
of  fugitive  slaves  was  keenly  felt.  Complaint  was  made  to 
England  and  damages  asked  for  the  liberated  slaves.  Eng 
land  however  was  inclined  to  refuse  the  American  claim 
on  the  mistaken  ground  that  her  laws  against  slavery  ex 
tended  to  foreign  vessels  within  her  ports. 

In  the  United  States  the  war  spirit  which  had  been 
effectually  quieted  in  1839,  broke  out  afresh  in  1840  over 
new  developments  in  the  "Caroline"  episode.  Alexander 
McLeod,  a  British  subject,  boasted  in  New  York  of  having 
taken  part  in  the  destruction  of  the  "Caroline,"  and  that 

34  Scott 's  Cases  on  International  Law,  p.  252. 


198  [26 

he  had  fired  the  shot  which  killed  the  American,  Durfree. 
He  was  immediately  arrested  and  imprisoned  in  Lockport, 
New  York,  under  a  charge  of  murder.35  The  popular  cry 
was  that  he  should  be  hanged,  and  in  view  of  the  feeling  of 
resentment  prevalent  on  the  frontier,  there  was  a  reason 
able  prospect  that  the  threat  would  be  executed. 

In  England  a  feeling,  no  less  strong,  was  created  that  if 
McLeod  was  hanged,  war  would  be  declared.  The  govern 
ment  had  assumed  the  responsibility  of  the  destruction  of 
the  "Caroline,"  and  a  just  indignation  was  felt  that  an 
Englishman  should  be  tried  by  a  foreign  court,  with  a  pros 
pect  of  being  convicted  and  executed,  for  acts  which  were 
committed  under  the  orders  of  his  government.  In  this 
important  crisis  the  United  States  government  was  next  to 
helpless.  McLeod  was  held  for  trial  by  a  New  York  State 
court  and  there  was  then  no  authority  by  which  his  case 
could  be  transferred  to  the  federal  courts.  The  only  thing 
to  be  done  was  to  assure  him  a  fair  trial  before  the  State 
court  and  furnish  any  possible  evidence  for  his  defense. 
England's  demands  for  his  immediate  release  could  not  be 
granted.36 

On  the  whole,  Anglo-American  relations  at  the  close  of 
Van  Buren's  administration  were  in  a  very  complicated 
and  uncertain  state.  The  boundary  question  had  been  dis 
puted  for  so  many  years,  in  spite  of  repeated  attempts  to 
settle  it,  that  peaceable  means  were  nearly  exhausted.  The 
hostile  feeling  on  the  frontier  had  brought  the  border  States 
to  a  condition  of  military  preparation  very  war-like  and 
threatening.37  Maine  had  demanded  that,  unless  a  settle 
ment  was  reached  in  the  negotiations  then  pending,  the 
federal  government  should  take  military  possession  of  the 
entire  disputed  territory.38  The  Governor  of  New  Bruns- 


ss  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  53. 

se  Senate  Document  No.  1,  1st  Sess.,  22nd  Cong. 

37  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Ser.,  Vol.  62,  pp.  1238-1241. 

38  House  Journal,  26th  Congress,  2nd  Sess.,  p.  796. 


27]  199 

wick,  on  the  other  hand,  was  instructed  to  retain  possession 
of  the  same  territory,  by  military  force  if  necessary.  Under 
the  constant  stress  of  popular  hostile  sentiment  the  situation 
of  armed  neutrality  could  not  be  indefinitely  maintained. 
Add  to  this  aggravated  boundary  question  the  other  ques 
tions  of  international  relations  then  in  dispute,  and  we  can 
appreciate  the  critical  complexity  of  them  all.  Briefly  sum 
marizing,  the  unsettled  boundary,  the  violation  of  American 
territory  in  the  "Caroline"  episode,  the  trial  of  Alexander 
McLeod  for  acts  authorized  by  his  government,  the  right 
of  English  cruisers  to  "visit"  American  merchantmen  on 
the  high  seas,  and  the  exercise  of  territorial  jurisdiction  by 
England's  colonial  authorities  over  vessels  storm-driven 
into  her  ports,  were  the  questions  which  combined  to  enforce 
the  negotiations  of  the  treaty  of  Washington,  commonly 
known  as  the  Webster- Ashburton  Treaty. 

II.  THE  MAKING  OF  THE  TEEATY. 

In  the  Presidential  election  of  1840  General  Harrison 
made  a  sweeping  campaign  of  the  country  and  his  party, 
the  Whig,  went  into  office  by  a  great  popular  victory.  In 
forming  his  cabinet  Harrison  was  singularly  fortunate,  in 
view  of  the  existing  state  of  foreign  affairs,  to  be  able  to 
entrust  the  Department  of  State  to  a  man  of  such  eminent 
capabilities  as  Daniel  Webster.  To  his  sound  judgment 
and  cool,  masterly  conduct  of  the  affairs  of  State  is  largely 
due  the  credit  of  successfully  terminating  the  complicated 
series  of  disputes  which  had  arisen  between  the  United 
States  and  England. 

Negotiations  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary  were 
reopened  by  England  with  Webster  and  the  new  adminis 
tration  in  March,  1841.  Instead  of  continuing  from  the 
point  where  negotiations  had  stopped  in  August,  1840, 
Palmerston  now  referred  back  to  his  first  draft  for  conven 
tion  of  which  he  directed  Mr.  Fox  "to  show  the  new  secre 
tary  its  reasonableness. ' '  Webster,  however,  suspended  any 


200  [28 

action  until  he  could  become  more  acquainted  with  the 
question  and  its  course  of  discussion.39  But  before  any 
further  action  was  taken  the  death  of  President  Harrison 
after  one  month  in  office  suspended  all  negotiations  for  a 
time.  This  unexpected  calamity  also  introduced  a  new  dif 
ficulty  into  the  work  of  the  administration.  Tyler,  the 
vice-president,  who  succeeded  Harrison,  disagreed  with  his 
party  to  such  an  extent  that  his  entire  cabinet,  with  the 
exception  of  Webster,  resigned,  and  the  popular  support 
he  should  have  received  in  Congress  was  withdrawn.  Under 
the  spell  of  this  estrangement,  it  seemed  dubious  that  any 
treaty  which  the  President  might  propose  would  be  heartily 
received  in  the  Senate  and  ratified. 

During  the  summer  of  1841,  Webster  intimated  to  Mr. 
Fox  that  he  was  disposed  to  settle  the  boundary  difficulties 
by  a  conventional  line  or  line  by  compromise.40  It  is  well 
known  that  Webster  saw  little  hope  in  continuing  the  old 
negotiations  for  a  joint  survey  commission  with  ultimate 
umpirage.  His  opinion  was  thus  expressed  in  the  Senate  a 
few  years  later :  ' '  Mr.  President,  it  is  true  that  I  regarded 
the  case  as  hopeless,  without  an  entire  change  in  the  manner 
of  proceeding."41  Here  was  a  distinct  step  toward  peace 
able  settlement.  It  was  a  move  to  recover  the  question  from 
the  great  tangle  of  diplomatic  proceedure  in  which  it  had 
remained  so  long  and  accomplished  so  little. 

In  England  more  changes  were  made  which  bore  upon 
the  final  settlement  of  the  difficulty.  Lord  Melbourne's 
Ministry  was  succeeded  in  September,  1841,  by  that  of  Sir 
Kobert  Peel,  and  the  management  of  foreign  affairs,  hith 
erto  entrusted  to  Viscount  Palmerston,  was  taken  up  by 
Lord  Aberdeen,  a  man  much  less  sharp  and  antagonistic 
than  his  predecessor.  The  United  States  Minister  to  Eng- 


39  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Ser.,  Vol.  67,  p.  1236. 

40  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  70. 

41  Webster's  Speech  in  the  Senate  April  1846,  in  vindication  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington.     Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  p.  239. 


29]  201 

land,  Mr.  Stephenson,  who  had  been  a  match  for  Palmers- 
ton's  uncompromising  diplomacy,  was  succeeded  by  Mr. 
Edward  Everett,  eminently  conciliatory,  and,  as  an  old 
friend  of  Webster,  in  full  sympathy  with  his  views.42  Thus 
both  nations  were  represented  by  new  administrations.  The 
old  petty  differences  could  now  be  abandoned  and  a  new 
course  of  negotiation  begun.  But  before  negotiations  act 
ually  began,  one  of  the  most  important  difficulties  attending 
the  settlement  was  eliminated.  Alexander  McLeod  was 
tried  at  Utica,  New  York,  and  by  proving  an  alibi  was 
acquitted  in  October,  1841.  Thus  the  war  cloud  which  had 
hung  so  threateningly  over  this  transaction  was  dispersed.43 

It  had  been  decided  by  Palmerston  and  Forsyth  that 
negotiations  for  the  settlement  of  the  boundary  should  be 
transferred  to  Washington.  This  decision  was  now  carried 
out  by  Aberdeen  in  a  way  both  unexpected  and  effective. 
On  December  26,  1841,  he  invited  Mr.  Everett  to  a  confer 
ence  and  informed  him  that  the  British  Ministry  would  take 
a  decisive  step  toward  a  settlement  of  the  questions  in  dis 
pute  between  the  two  countries  by  sending  a  special  min 
ister  to  Washington  with  full  powers  to  treat  for  the  settle 
ment  of  all  pending  questions,  and  named  Lord  Ashburton 
as  the  man  selected  for  the  work.44  The  English  Ministry 
had  come  to  the  same  conclusion  as  that  reached  by  Webster, 
that  a  new  manner  of  proceeding  was  necessary  to  accom 
plish  anything  toward  a  settlement.  All  negotiations  upon 
the  questions  pending  were  abandoned  in  London  and 
turned  over  to  the  Special  Minister. 

In  the  United  States  the  news  of  the  Special  Mission 
was  welcomed.  Webster  sent  word  of  his  warm  approval 


42  Lodge,  Daniel  Webster,  p.  252.. 

43  To  prevent  such  possibilities  from  arising  in  the  future  Webster 
prepared  a  bill  which  was  made  a  statute  August  29,  1842,  by  which 
such    cases    involving   international    questions    should    be    transferred 
from  the  State  to  the  Federal  Courts.     Webster's  Works,  Vol.  VI,  p. 
267. 

44  See  Appendix  A.     (1). 


202  [30 

to  the  English  Ministry,  and  immediately  began  to  prepare 
the  way  for  the  negotiations  in  America.45  He  was  not 
without  a  plan  in  this  preparation.  In  1839  it  had  been 
rumored  that  the  United  States  would  send  a  similar  Spe 
cial  Mission  to  England,  and  Webster  heard  that  his  name 
had  been  suggested  to  the  President  by  Poinsett,  the  Secre 
tary  of  War.  To  justify  this  good  opinion  of  Mr.  Poinsett, 
Webster  had  drawn  up  a  plan  of  negotiation  by  which  he 
thought  such  a  Special  Minister  should  proceed  and  sent 
it  to  the  President.  Many  of  the  leading  features  of  this 
plan  were  later  embodied  in  the  negotiation  of  the  Treaty 
of  Washington.46  Chief  among  them  was  to  secure  the  con 
currence  and  aid  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts  in  the  nego 
tiation  for  a  conventional  line  of  compromise.  It  was  clear 
to  Webster  that  without  the  cooperation  of  these  two  States 
nothing  could  be  done  toward  bringing  the  adverse  claims 
to  a  common  understanding. 

Ashburton  arrived  in  the  United  States  April  4,  1842, 
and  on  the  llth,  Webster  sent  letters  to  the  Governors  of 
Maine  and  Massachusetts,  announcing  the  arrival  and  pur 
pose  of  the  Special  Mission  and  asking  their  active  cooper 
ation.47  He  was  anxious  to  avoid  having  the  question  in 
volved  with  the  local  prejudice  which  was  likely  to  be  found 
in  the  State  Legislatures,  and  asked  that  commissioners  be 
sent  to  Washington  to  confer  with  the  National  Represen 
tatives  and  act  for  their  States  in  the  negotiations.  The 
difficulties  of  settlement  even  by  this  means  were  great. 
Both  States  had  declared  in  favor  of  a  settlement  by  the 
treaty  of  1783,  and  Maine  still  held  stubbornly  to  her  claim 
for  the  whole  disputed  territory.  But  Webster's  appeal 
for  a  compromise  settlement,  and  for  the  appointment  of 
commissioners  to  gain  that  end  was  well  received.  Gov 
ernor  Davis  of  Massachusetts  replied  that  the  commissioners 


45  See  Appendix  A.     (2). 

46  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  2. 

47  See  Appendix  A.     (3). 


31]  203 

would  be  appointed,  and  that  the  people  of  the  State  were 
ready  to  make  reasonable  concessions  to  the  convenience  or 
necessity  of  Great  Britain,  "but  nothing — not  a  rood  of 
barren  heath  or  rock — to  unfounded  claims."48  In  Maine 
the  consent  to  compromise  was  not  so  easily  obtained.  It 
was  necessary  to  convene  the  legislature  in  special  session 
and  overcome  local  prejudice  and  political  antagonism  with 
an  appeal  for  national  patriotism.  Webster  was  in  Boston 
early  in  May,  and  sent  Jared  Sparks,  who  was  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  points  of  strength  and  weakness  in  both 
claims,  to  influence  the  Maine  legislators  for  a  compromise. 
In  this  work  he  was  successful,  as  reported  in  his  letter  to 
Webster,  May  19,  1842.49  Resolutions  were  passed  on  the 
26th  in  favor  of  a  conventional  line  and  for  the  appoint 
ment  of  four  commissioners,  two  from  each  party,  to  give 
the  State's  assent  to  such  terms  as  seemed  reasonable  and 
fair.50  To  Webster  this  meant  a  preliminary  success  in  the 
settlement.  He  is  said  to  have  announced  this  result  to 
President  Tyler  with  the  comment,  "The  crisis  is  passed." 
The  Commissioners  of  both  States  were  well  chosen,  with 
out  reference  to  their  political  connections.  Massachusetts 
was  represented  by  Abbott  Lawrence,  John  Mills,  and 
Charles  Allen,  and  Maine  by  Edward  Kavanagh,  Edward 
Kent,  Wm.  P.  Preble,  and  John  Otis. 

A  word  as  to  the  negotiators,  before  entering  upon  a 
discussion  of  their  work,  is  not  amiss.  Daniel  Webster's 
career  as  one  of  the  leading  statesmen  of  the  United  States 
is  too  well  known  to  need  repetition.  But  his  peculiar 
position  in  the  administration  at  this  particular  time  merits 
our  attention  and  approval.  Webster  was  prominently  as 
sociated  with  the  Whig  party,  which  had  declared  Tyler  to 
be  a  traitor  to  its  principles  and  caused  the  members  of 
Harrison 's  cabinet,  who  had  been  asked  to  continue  in  office 


48  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  99. 

4»  Curtis,  Ibid.,  p.  100. 

so  Maine  Historical  Society,  Vol.  VIII,  p.  310. 


204  [32 

under  Tyler,  to  resign,  with  the  single  exception  of  Webster. 
In  the  approaching  crisis  in  the  international  disputes, 
Webster  saw  his  duty  to  remain  with  the  new  President 
in  the  face  of  severe  party  criticism  and  complete  the  settle 
ment,  which  he  believed  he  could  accomplish.  At  the  pres 
ent  time,  when  we  can  see  the  important  influence  of  Webs 
ter  in  bringing  about  the  final  settlement,  we  are  apt  to 
underrate  the  difficulties  he  faced  in  staying  at  his  post. 
It  was  no  easy  thing  for  him,  at  that  time,  before  the  treaty 
was  made  and  before  the  people  appreciated  the  value  of 
the  work  he  was  to  accomplish,  to  remain  allied  to  the  Pres 
ident  against  whom  political  anger  and  party  excitement 
were  raised  to  a  high  pitch.  His  action  in  undertaking  the 
work  of  the  negotiation  is  therefore  most  commendable, 
since  true  patriotism  and  the  cause  of  peace  were  his  only 
motives.51 

Lord  Ashburton,  also,  was  well  qualified  to  accomplish 
a  compromise  settlement.  He  was  favorably  known  and 
respected  in  the  United  States  through  his  commercial  as 
sociation  with  the  house  of  Baring  Brothers  and  by  his 
marriage  to  an  American  lady.  We  have  ample  evidences 
of  his  unselfish  motives  in  accepting  the  Special  Mission, 
but  nothing  summarizes  them  better  than  his  own  state 
ment  in  a  letter  to  Gallatin  of  April  12,  1842.52  He  and 
Gallatin  were  old  friends,  ripe  in  years,  and  had  witnessed 
this  controversy  from  the  beginning.  Ashburton  says  in 
part :  ' '  You  will  probably  be  surprised  at  my  undertaking 
this  task  at  my  period  of  life.  *  *  *  The  truth  is  that 
I  am  tempted  by  my  great  anxiety  in  the  cause,  and  the 
extreme  importance  which  I  have  always  attached  to  the 
maintenance  of  peace  between  our  countries.  The  latter 
circumstance  induced  my  political  friends  to  press  this  ap 
pointment  upon  me,  and  with  much  hesitation  founded 
solely  on  my  health  and  age,  I  yielded."  He  professes  his 

si  Lodge :   "Webster,"  p.  251. 

52  Gallatin 's  Writings,  Vol.  II,  p.  595. 


33]  205 

belief  that  all  political  parties  in  the  United  States  are  in 
clined  to  secure  peace  with  England  on  reasonable  terms: 
"I  expect  and  desire  no  other,  and  my  present  character 
of  a  diplomatist  is  so  new  to  me  that  I  know  no  other  course 
than  candor  and  plain  dealing." 

The  commissioners  arrived  in  Washington  and  the  nego 
tiations  officially  commenced  June  13,  1842,  with  a  letter 
from  Ashburton  to  Webster.53  In  this,  he  reviewed  the 
course  of  preceding  attempts  at  settling  the  question,  in 
which  no  progress  had  been  made  because  each  party  had 
held  uncompromisingly  his  own  claim.  The  present  at 
tempt,  he  said,  to  succeed,  must  proceed  not  as  a  renewal 
of  the  controversy,  but  with  a  full  realization  of  previous 
failures.  By  an  interchange  of  notes  of  June  17th,  a 
personal  conference  was  arranged  for  the  next  day  and  by 
Webster's  request,  Ashburton,  a  few  days  later,  wrote  a 
statement  of  his  views  on  the  subject  of  a  conventional  line. 
In  this  statement  Ashburton  again  expressed  his  desire  for 
frank  presentations  of  their  case.  England's  object,  he 
said,  was  not  a  gain  of  acres  of  land,  so  that  he  was  willing 
to  concede  all  material  advantages,  which  were  not  essential 
to  England  and  her  subjects.  He  suggested  the  St.  John 
as  a  good  boundary  from  its  intersection  with  the  north  line 
from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  to  the  Highlands,  except 
for  the  Madawaska  settlement  on  the  south  bank.  But  he 
could  not  "in  any  case  abandon  the  interests  of  these 
people,"  whose  history  and  personal  desire  bound  them  to 
England. 

Webster  submitted  Ashburton 's  letter  to  the  Maine  com 
missioners,  and  their  reply  was  received  June  29th.  It 
shows  that  they  were  still  firm  in  their  belief  that  the  whole 
of  the  disputed  territory  was  theirs  by  right,  but  that  they 
were  willing  to  make  concessions  necessary  to  secure  Eng 
land's  line  of  colonial  communication.54  For  this  they  sug- 

53  Congressional  Globe,  27th  Congress,  3rd  Sess.,  p.  4. 
B*  See  Map,  Appendix  D. 


206  [34 

gested  that  the  line  follow  the  St.  John  to  a  point  about 
three  miles  above  the  mouth  of  the  Madawaska,  and  from 
there  turn  northward  continuing  parallel  to  that  river  al 
most  its  source,  whence  it  turned  westward  by  a  straight 
line  through  the  head  of  Lake  Pohenagamook  to  the  High 
lands.  Thus  the  whole  valley  of  the  Madawaska,  which 
they  said  was  the  real  Upper  St.  John,  was  allowed  for 
England's  road  of  communications.  They  declared  that  if 
Ashburton's  claim  for  the  settlements  south  of  the  St.  John 
was  sine  qua  non,  they  would  refuse  to  negotiate  further. 

The  negotiations  had  reached  a  critical  state.  The  de 
cision  of  the  boundary  rested  awkwardly  upon  a  disagree 
ment  between  the  Maine  commissioners  and  the  English 
Minister,  with  Webster  trying  to  mediate  between  them  for 
mutual  concessions.  At  this  juncture  matters  were  almost 
disrupted  because  of  a  misunderstanding  of  the  British 
home  government  concerning  the  American  claim  in  the  af 
fair  of  the  ' '  Creole. ' '  The  only  demand  the  United  States 
raised  upon  the  circumstances  of  this  case  was  that  her 
merchant  ships  seeking  shelter  in  English  ports  should  not 
become  subject  to  the  local  territorial  jurisdiction.  The 
English  ministry  confused  the  American  claim  with  a  de 
mand  for  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves,  which  was  contrary 
to  England's  law  against  slavery.  Webster  explained  the 
distinction  in  his  letter  to  Everett,  June  28. 55  In  that  let 
ter  he  intimated  that  something  in  Ashburton's  recent  in 
structions  bore  strongly  on  this  point  and  conspired  to  make 
Ashburton  think  of  returning  to  England  without  complet 
ing  the  work  of  the  Special  Mission.  The  combined  urging 
of  Webster  and  President  Tyler  succeeded  in  preventing 
such  a  termination  of  the  negotiations  at  this  unfinished 
point,  but  it  required  all  of  the  Secretary's  skill  and  tact 
to  keep  this  question  out  of  the  discussions  until  the  bound 
ary  question  was  settled.56 

55  See  Appendix  C.     (1). 

56  <  <  It  is  a  fact,  which  Mr.  Webster  always  acknowledged,   that 
President  Tyler's  address,  in  persuading  Lord  Ashburton  to  remain, 
was  most  skillfully  and  happily  used. ' '    Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol. 
II,  p.  105,  note. 


35]  207 

To  fix  a  boundary  with  concessions  and  equivalents  to 
which  both  Maine  and  England  would  agree,  was  a  perplex 
ing  matter.  Maine  had  refused  to  consider  any  part  of  the 
territory  which  she  claimed  under  the  treaty  of  1783,  as  an 
equivalent  on  the  part  of  England  for  the  concessions  of 
Maine.  England  could  offer  equivalents  which  were  just 
and  equitable  to  the  United  States,  but  none  which  would 
inure  directly  to  the  State  of  Maine.  The  strip  of  territory 
along  the  forty-fifth  parallel  and  free  navigation  of  the  St. 
John  had  been  already  suggested  by  Ashburton,  but  at  least 
one  of  these  in  no  way  benefited  Maine.  Webster  had  from 
the  first  recognized  this  difficulty  as  most  important,  and 
considered  various  ways  by  which  it  could  be  overcome.  In 
a  private  note  to  Mr.  Everett  as  early  as  April  25,  1842,  he 
speculates  on  possible  equivalents  to  be  offered  to  Maine.57 
One  of  his  suggestions  was  to  include  within  the  United 
States  a  tract  of  territory  lying  between  the  due  north  line 
from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  and  the  St.  John.  This 
territory  he  did  not  think  possessed  much  agricultural  value, 
but  would  have  great  weight  in  the  negotiations  since  it 
conceded  to  Maine  territory  undoubtedly  belonging  to  Eng 
land.  If  this  proposition  was  ever  submitted  by  Webster 
to  Ashburton,  it  was  not  well  received.  There  is  no  mention 
found  of  it  in  their  written  correspondence.  The  only  other 
equivalent  suggested  by  either  Webster  or  Ashburton,  was 
the  privilege  of  sending  timber  and  produce  down  the  St. 
John  free  of  any  duty  not  imposed  on  similar  articles  grown 
in  New  Brunswick.  Even  this  was  not  considered  an  actual 
concession  but  more  as  a  recognition  of  a  right  which  Maine 
had  claimed  for  many  years.  The  first  negotiation  entered 
into  for  the  boundary  settlement  after  the  rejection  of  the 
award,  embodied  a  demand  by  the  United  States  for  free 
navigation  of  the  St.  John.58  The  prospect  of  coming  to 
amicable  agreement  was  very  obscure.  It  seemed  impossi- 


57  Private  Correspondence  of  Daniel  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  120. 
ss  Vaughan   to   Viscount   Goderich.     American   Historical   Eeview, 
Vol.  VII,  p.  503. 


208  [36 

ble  to  find  terms  which  would  satisfy  both  Maine  and  Eng 
land. 

At  this  point  Webster  and  Ashburton  put  aside  the  for 
malities  of  diplomatic  correspondence  and  conducted  their 
negotiations  in  personal  conferences.59  They  attacked  the 
difficulties  which  confronted  them  in  a  spirit  similar  to  that 
of  two  business  men  who  enter  a  private  office  and  discuss 
an  arrangement  for  their  mutual  benefit.  Ashburton  had 
received  the  reply  of  the  Maine  commissioners  of  June  29th, 
with  Webster's  comments  on  the  propositions  it  contained, 
July  8th.  He  replied  July  llth,  that  their  proposed  line 
north  of  the  St.  John  was,  "wholly  inadmissable, "  and 
reluctantly  implied  that  if  it  was  necessary  he  would  sur 
render  the  Madawaska  settlements  on  the  south  bank  of 
that  river.  In  regard  to  these  settlements,  Maine  also  had 
taken  a  somewhat  conciliatory  tone.  Her  commissioners 
had  offered  to  allow  the  Madawaska  settlers  to  choose  for 
themselves  to  which  government  they  would  adhere,  on  the 
condition  that  in  case  the  territory  was  given  to  New  Bruns 
wick,  all  grants  of  land  hitherto  given  by  Maine  should  be 
confirmed.  It  was  apparent  that  both  sides  were  willing  to 
accept  the  St.  John  as  the  boundary  as  far  as  the  mouth  of 
the  Madawaska,  but  from  there  to  the  Highlands  their 
claims  differed  decidedly.  To  bring  this  disagreement  to 
a  compromise  basis  was  the  problem  which  the  negotiators 
proposed  to  solve  in  their  conferences.  The  only  feasible 
equivalent  offered  to  Maine  and  Massachusetts  for  their  con 
cessions  of  land,  was  the  free  navigation  of  the  St.  John  and 
this  was  not  considered  by  the  commissioners  as  sufficient 
recompense  for  their  losses.  One  more  means  of  satisfying 
the  States  remained.  That  was  to  pay  cash  for  the  territory 
which  they  were  asked  to  give  up.  Webster  agreed  that  the 
United  States  could  do  this  in  a  manner  more  acceptable  to 
the  States  than  if  the  offer  came  from  England.  The  set 
tlement  of  the  boundary  and  advantages  gained  in  other 


Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  115. 


37]  209 

parts  of  the  line  were  ample  justification  for  this  payment 
by  the  national  government.  As  it  afterwards  proved,  this 
was  the  expedient  which  severed  the  deadlock  between  the 
adverse  claims  and  brought  the  boundary  question  to  its 
final  settlement. 

On  July  15th,  Webster  sent  to  the  Maine  Commissioners 
a  draft  of  the  terms  which  he  thought  would  satisfy  their 
own  claims  and  be  acceptable  to  Lord  Ashburton.60  In  this 
he  included  his  offer  on  the  part  of  the  federal  government 
to  pay  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  in  equal 
moieties  to  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  besides  all  expenses 
incurred  by  them  in  protecting  the  disputed  territory  and 
surveying  the  line.  The  boundary  which  he  proposed  was 
practically  the  same  as  that  afterwards  accepted  into  the 
treaty.  It  is  important  to  note  that  this  line  represented 
a  compromise  between  the  first  claim  of  Lord  Ashburton, 
favoring  the  main  St.  John,  and  the  line  suggested  by  the 
Maine  Commissioners  on  June  29th.61  The  United  States 
gained  seven-twelfths  of  the  disputed  territory,  equal  in 
value  to  about  four-fifths  of  the  whole.  In  addition  to  this, 
the  old  line  of  Valentine  and  Collins  was  recognized  as  the 
boundary  along  the  forty-fifth  parallel,  thus  giving  Rouse's 
Point  to  the  United  States,  and  Hall's  stream  was  accepted 
as  the  northwest  source  of  the  Connecticut,  England  there 
by  conceding  another  tract  of  valuable  territory.  Webster 
urged  upon  the  commissioners  the  patriotism  which  should 
prompt  them  to  secure  a  settlement  of  the  question  by  ac 
cepting  these  terms.  In  this  way  he  endeavored  to  relieve 
his  proposition  of  any  appearances  of  a  pecuniary  bargain, 
and  allow  Maine  to  yield  her  claims  without  sacrificing  her 
principle.  He  recognized  that  the  chief  benefits  of  a  settle 
ment  on  the  terms  he  proposed  would  inure  to  the  United 
States  and  that  in  fairness,  the  States  of  Maine  and  Massa 
chusetts  deserved  a  recompense  for  their  cession  of  claims. 


See  Appendix  A.     (5). 
See  Map,  Appendix  D. 


210  [38 

In  this  case  he  appealed  to  the  commissioners  to  accept  his 
arrangement  for  paying  the  states  for  their  claims,  not  as 
a  "bargain  of  acres,"  but  as  means  to  secure  international 
peace  and  promote  the  welfare  of  the  federal  state. 

The  fate  of  Webster's  proposition  and  probably  of  the 
whole  negotiation,  was  decided  July  22,  1842,  when  the 
Maine  commissioners  finally  gave  assent  to  the  terms  em 
bodied  in  Webster's  communication  of  July  15th.62  The 
Massachusetts  commissioners  had  expressed  their  approval 
two  days  before,  a  fact  which  probably  helped  to  bring 
Maine  to  an  agreement.  In  consenting  to  the  terms  of 
fered  by  Webster,  the  Commissioners  still  maintained  that 
they  made  a  sacrifice  of  extensive  territory  which  they 
rightfully  owned,  and  for  which  no  adequate  compensation 
was  given.  It  was  a  surrender,  they  said,  "of  a  portion  of 
the  birth-right  of  the  people  of  the  state, ' '  made  in  favor  of 
the  judgment  of  her  sister-states  and  in  a  "spirit  of  attach 
ment  and  patriotic  devotion  of  their  state  to  the  Union.63 
The  States  asked  that  certain  amendments  be  made  to  the 
terms  before  they  were  incorporated  into  a  treaty ;  viz.,  that 
the  privilege  of  free  navigation  of  the  St.  John  be  extended 
to  include  farm  produce  as  well  as  timber ;  that  the  amount 
of  the  ' '  disputed  territory  fund, ' '  which  was  the  money  re 
ceived  by  the  New  Brunswick  authorities  for  the  timber 
cut  in  the  disputed  territory,  be  paid  over  to  the  United 
States  for  the  use  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts64  and  that 
all  possessory  titles  to  land  previously  granted  by  Maine, 
Massachusetts  and  New  Brunswick  be  reciprocally  recog 
nized  by  both  governments.  Massachusetts  also  asked  that 


62  Ashburton,  in  a  private  note,  undated,  wrote  as  follows  to  Web 
ster:  "1  have  had  an  interview  with  the  gentlemen  from  Maine  and 
I  incline  to  think  they  will  consent  to  our  line.     I  explained  that  I 
was  at  the  end  of  my  line,  and  that  they  must  therefore  say  yes  or 
no."    Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  120. 

63  Webster 's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  pp.  49,  56. 

64  The  disposal  of  the  ' '  disputed  territory  fund ' '  carried  into  ef 
fect  an  arrangement  entered  into  some  years  before  regarding  timber 
cut  upon  the  disputed  territory.     Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official 
Papers,  pp.  61,  62. 


39]  211 

the  amount  to  be  paid  by  the  United  States  be  increased  to 
one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  dollars  for  each  of  the  two 
States.  Ashburton  accepted  the  additional  terms,  and  in 
giving  his  official  approval  of  them,  the  settlement  of  the 
northeastern  boundary  was  at  last  assured. 

The  negotiators  next  directed  their  attention  to  the  set 
tlement  of  the  boundary  described  under  the  seventh  article 
of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  and  to  framing  their  agreements 
into  the  articles  of  a  treaty.  But  the  difficult  part  of  the 
negotiation  had  been  accomplished.  The  boundary  on  the 
northwest  was  not  complicated  with  "States'  claims"  or 
adverse  local  jurisdictions,  nor  were  the  other  disputed 
questions  of  international  relations  beyond  the  reach  of  a 
conciliatory  adjustment.  They  had  all  been  touched  upon 
in  the  conferences  between  the  negotiators  so  that  their  final 
settlement  was  largely  a  matter  of  setting  into  official  form 
what  had  already  been  informally  agreed  upon. 

The  country  west  of  Lake  Superior  was  still  wild  and 
uninhabited,  except  by  Indians  and  pioneer  trappers,  so 
that  the  boundary  in  that  quarter  was  easily  fixed  by  a 
compromise  line.65  Ashburton,  on  July  16th,  had  proposed 
that  the  line  should  be  drawn  through  Pidgeon  River,  lo 
cated  about  half  way  between  the  lines  claimed  by  the  com 
missioners  under  the  seventh  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent, 
and  to  this  Webster  readily  assented  when  he  summarized 
the  settlements  on  all  the  points  of  boundary  in  his  com 
munication  of  July  27th.66  Through  the  water  communica 
tion  between  Lake  Huron  and  Lake  Superior,  the  boundary 
was  decided  in  favor  of  the  line  claimed  by  the  American 
commissioner  under  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  thus  ceding  to 
the  United  States  St.  George's,  or  Sugar  Island.  This, 
however,  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  equivalents  offered  for 
the  settlement  of  the  northeast  boundary. 

es  Webster  'a  Correspondence  with  Mr.  Delafield  and  Mr.  Ferguson 
of  July  20th  and  25th,  1842,  gives  the  opinion  of  those  gentlemen  upon 
the  character  of  the  territory  in  question.  "Webster's  Diplomatic 
and  Official  Papers,"  pp.  67,  72. 

ee  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  p.  57. 


212  [40 

In  the  final  negotiations  upon  the  international  disputes 
arising  out  of  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  the  case  of 
the  "Creole,"  and  the  "Caroline"  episode,  a  process  of 
selection  was  employed.  These  questions  were  all  more  or 
less  involved  with  other  disputes  between  the  two  countries. 
In  regard  to  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  we  have  already 
noticed  its  connection  with  the  right  of  search,  and  the  re 
vival  of  the  old  dispute  upon  this  point.  With  a  renewal 
of  that  question  came  the  question  of  impressment,  which, 
though  subdued  since  the  war  of  1812,  had  never  been  def 
initely  settled.  The  question  raised  by  the  case  of  the 
"Creole"  had  been  confused  in  England  with  the  extradi 
tion  of  fugitive  slaves.  In  the  "Caroline"  episode,  the 
complications  of  the  frontier  disturbances  and  a  necessity 
for  the  suppression  of  lawless  characters  were  involved. 
To  meet  these  questions  effectively,  Webster  and  Ashburton 
selected  for  treaty  articles,  what  they  considered  the  fun 
damental  causes  for  the  disputes,  and  left  the  settlement 
of  the  particular  cases  in  which  these  causes  had  operated 
to  an  official  correspondence  between  the  negotiators.  Thus 
in  the  treaty  itself  but  two  questions,  other  than  the  settle 
ment  of  the  boundary,  were  included ;  namely,  the  suppres 
sion  of  the  slave  trade  and  the  extradition  of  criminals  for 
certain  enumerated  offenses.  In  the  official  correspondence 
accompanying  the  treaty,  the  negotiators  dealt  with  the 
subject  of  interference  with  American  ships,  storm  driven 
into  the  ports  of  the  West  Indies,  with  the  attack  upon  and 
destruction  of  the  "Caroline"  and  with  the  subject  of  im 
pressment. 

An  account  of  the  negotiations  upon  these  questions  is 
necessarily  brief.  It  was  chiefly  conducted  by  personal  con 
ferences  between  the  negotiators,  of  which  no  minutes  or 
any  official  record  was  kept.  From  Webster's  correspond 
ence,  however,  some  light  is  thrown  upon  the  way  in  which 
the  arrangements  were  conducted.  As  early  as  April  26, 
1842,  Webster  writes  to  Mr.  Everett  in  London,  that  he 


41]  213 

has  proposed  to  Lord  Ashburton  a  practical  settlement  of 
the  right  of  search  difficulty  by  maintaining  for  a  limited 
time  independent  squadrons  on  the  African  Coast  for  the 
suppression  of  the  slave  trade.67  This  arrangement  was 
afterwards  spoken  of  by  Ashburton  as  the  "cruising  con 
vention,"  which  he  thought  was  a  favorable  means  to  ac 
complish  its  object.68  The  question  of  right  of  search 
brought  forth  a  lengthy  correspondence  between  Webster 
and  General  Cass,  then  United  States  Minister  to  France, 
who  was  much  disappointed  that  an  absolute  renunciation 
of  the  right  of  search  was  not  secured  by  the  United  States. 
The  discussion  of  the  question  of  the  '  *  Creole ' '  has  already 
been  mentioned  as  a  difficulty  in  the  boundary  settlement. 
The  chief  point  in  the  adjustment  of  this  question  was  to 
make  plain  the  distinction  between  a  remonstrance  by  the 
United  States  against  the  interference  with  American  ships 
seeking  shelter  in  British  ports  and  a  demand  for  the  return 
of  fugitive  slaves.  Upon  this  question  Webster  wrote  to 
John  Davis,  April  16,  1842,  as  follows:  "Our  position  in 
relation  to  the  'Creole'  has  been  misrepresented  by  some 
and  misunderstood  by  others,  but  it  is  defensible  and 
safe."69  Practically  all  of  the  agreements  afterwards  ex 
pressed  in  the  correspondence  explanatory  to  the  treaty, 
had  been  arranged  by  personal  conferences  even  before  the 
formal  settlement  of  the  boundary.  From  July  29th  to 
August  9th  these  agreements  were  given  official  tone  in  an 
interchange  of  formal  diplomatic  notes,  stating  the  views 
held  by  the  respective  governments  in  regard  to  each  of  the 
disputed  points.  A  proper  understanding  of  this  corre 
spondence  will  be  gained  in  our  study  of  the  treaty  in  its 
various  articles.70 

The  negotiations  were  brought  to  their  close  August  9, 
1842,  in  a  treaty  signed  by  Lord  Ashburton  and  Daniel 

67  Webster's  Private  Correspondence,  Vol.  II,  p.  124. 
es  Curtis,  Life  of  Webster,  Vol.  II,  p.  118. 
69  Webster's  Private  Correspondence,  Vol.  II,  p.  119. 
TO  See  Part  III.     (2). 


214  [42 

Webster,  entitled:  "A  treaty  to  settle  and  define  the  bound 
aries  between  the  territories  of  the  United  States  and  the 
possessions  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty  in  North  America; 
For  the  final  suppression  of  the  African  slave  trade;  and 
for  the  giving  up  of  criminals,  fugitive  from  justice  in  cer 
tain  cases."71  But  with  the  conclusion  of  the  negotiators' 
work,  the  final  settlement  of  the  treaties '  provisions  was  but 
half  assured.  Not  only  was  its  ratification  by  the  proper 
authorities  in  the  respective  governments  necessary  to  its 
finality  and  legal  enforcement,  but  laws  had  to  be  passed 
by  the  two  governments  to  carry  certain  of  its  provisions 
into  effect.  On  the  part  of  England,  the  article  relating 
to  extradition  was  without  binding  effect  until  substantiated 
by  an  act  of  Parliament;72  while  in  the  United  States  a 
bill  of  appropriation  was  necessary  to  carry  out  the  obliga 
tions  of  the  national  government  to  the  States  of  Maine  and 
Massachusetts  according  to  the  terms  of  the  fifth  article. 

In  England  the  difficulties  of  ratification,  such  as  con 
fronts  a  treaty  in  the  United  States,  are  eliminated.  Rati 
fication  there  is  a  prerogative  of  the  Crown  and  unless  the 
agreements  of  the  negotiator  are  radically  contrary  to  the 
national  interests,  his  engagements  are  unquestionably 
sanctioned  by  his  government.73  So  with  the  Webster- 
Ashburton  Treaty,  the  only  question  of  ratification  was  in 
regard  to  the  action  of  the  United  States.  England's  ac 
ceptance  of  it  was  practically  undoubted. 

The  President  referred  the  Treaty  to  the  Senate  August 
llth,  together  with  the  official  correspondence  of  the  ne 
gotiators  upon  the  questions  not  included  in  the  articles  of 
the  treaty.  He  sent  also  a  special  message  of  approval,  in 
which  he  explained  at  some  length  the  results  of  the  negotia 
tions  and  the  reasons  for  their  proposed  ratification  by  the 


71  See  Appendix  B. 

72  See  Appendix  A.     (5)  6. 

TS  S.  B.  Crandall,  ''Treaties,  their  Making  and  Enforcement," 
151. 


43]  215 

Senate.74  Regarding  the  boundary  settlement  a  recapitula 
tion  was  given  of  the  points  agreed  upon  and  the  difference 
which  had  been  settled.  An  important  advantage  was  no 
ticed  in  that  the  main  channels  of  the  St.  Lawrence,  which 
in  certain  cases  lay  entirely  within  the  boundary  of  one  of 
the  countries,  were  opened  to  free  navigation  by  the  ships 
of  both.  The  provisions  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave 
trade  were  explained  with  reference  to  their  bearing  upon 
the  right  of  search  and  the  principles  which  determined 
American  policy  in  this  regard.  Similarly  the  negotiations 
upon  the  questions  of  the  "Caroline,"  the  "Creole"  and 
impressment,  were  interpreted  by  the  President  as  definitive 
statements  of  the  ground  held  by  the  United  States  upon 
these  points. 

In  the  Senate  the  Treaty  was  referred,  on  a  motion  by 
Mr.  Rives,  to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  of  which 
he  was  chairman.  The  report  of  this  committee  favoring 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  was  received  August  15th  and 
the  Senate,  in  secret  session,  proceeded  to  deliberate  upon 
it.75  It  was  made  the  order  of  the  day  for  the  17th,  and  the 
discussion  continued  through  the  19th  and  20th.  In  this 
debate  the  chief  opponent  to  the  treaty  was  Senator  Benton 
of  Missouri,  who  made  several  motions  for  amendment  and 
alteration  of  the  treaty,  all  of  which  were  rejected  when 
voted  upon.  Mr.  Rives  led  the  defense  of  the  treaty  before 
the  Senate,  and  finally  after  defeating  the  various  attempts 
of  the  opposition  to  amend  its  articles,  he  submitted,  on 
August  20th,  the  following  resolution : 

"Resolved  (two-thirds  of  the  senators  present  concur 
ring),  That  the  Senate  advise  and  consent  to  the  ratifica 
tion  of  the  treaty  to  settle  and  define  the  boundaries  between 
the  territories  of  the  United  States  and  the  possessions  of 
Her  Britannic  Majesty  in  North  America ;  for  the  final  sup 
pression  of  the  African  slave  trade;  and  for  the  giving  up 


74  Congressional  Globe,  27th  Congress,  3d  Sess.,  p.  2. 

75  Congressional  Globe,  27th  Congress,  3d  Session,  p.  1. 


216  [44 

of  criminals  fugitive  from  justice  in  certain  cases."  This 
resolution  was  carried  by  the  decisive  vote  of  39  to  9,  and 
ordered  to  be  communicated  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States. 

The  treaty  having  been  also  duly  ratified  by  England, 
the  exchange  of  ratifications  took  place  in  London,  October 
13,  1842,  between  Edward  Everett,  the  United  States  min 
ister,  and  Lord  Aberdeen,  the  English  Secretary  of  Foreign 
affairs.  The  President  formally  announced  the  treaty  in 
the  United  States  by  a  proclamation  of  November  10th.70 

In  the  United  States  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by 
such  a  decisive  vote  called  forth  many  expressions  of  grat 
ification  from  prominent  men  of  the  country.  Foremost 
among  these  was  Webster  himself.  On  August  21,  1842,  he 
wrote  as  follows  to  Mr.  Jeremiah  Mason :  "I  cannot  forego 
the  pleasure  of  saying  to  an  old  and  constant  friend,  who, 
I  know,  takes  a  personal  as  well  as  a  public  interest  in  the 
matter,  that  the  treaty  was  ratified  last  evening  by  a  vote 
of  thirty-nine  to  nine.  I  did  not  look  for  a  majority  quite 
so  large.  I  am  truly  thankful  the  thing  is  done."  Mr. 
Mason  replied  on  August  28th  that :  "In  my  opinion  it  is  of 
more  importance  to  the  welfare  of  the  country  than  any 
thing  else  that  has  taken  place  since  the  Treaty  of  Ghent. '  '7T 
Chancellor  Kent  added  his  commendations  to  the  treaty  in 
the  following  words:  "That  act  (for  the  removal  of  certain 
cases  to  federal  courts;  passed  August  27,  1842)  and  the 
10th  article  of  the  treaty,  providing  for  the  surrender  of 
fugitives  are  momentous  and  most  conspicuous  improve 
ments  in  our  national  and  diplomatic  codes. '  '78  Even  Gal- 
latin,  who  had  so  long  championed  the  claim  of  the  United 
States  for  the  boundary  as  described  in  1783,  sanctioned  the 
settlement  reached  by  the  compromise  line.  He  said  con 
cerning  it :  "  The  arrangement  being  founded  upon  a  sup 
posed  equivalent,  the  principal  part  of  which  is  of  an  in- 

76  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  p.  230. 

77  Webster's  Private  Correspondence,  Vol.  II,  pp.  146,  148. 

78  Ibid.,  p.  160. 


45]  217 

definite  value,  may  be  accepted  without  wounding  the  honor 
of  the  country.  And  since  the  acquiescence  of  Maine,  the 
party  most  interested,  removes  the  great  obstacle  to  an  ac 
commodation,  I  would  think  it  not  only  unwise  in  the  pres 
ent  situation  of  the  country,  but  quite  unjustifiable  to  run 
the  risks  incident  to  the  failure  of  the  pending  negotia 
tions."79 

It  has  been  pointed  out  by  some  writers  that  the  ratifica 
tion  of  the  treaty  by  a  three-fourths  vote  of  the  Senate, 
hostile  in  politics  to  the  President,  signified  greater  success 
on  the  part  of  Webster.  This  conclusion,  however,  is  apt 
to  be  misleading  and  to  cause  the  supposition  that  President 
Tyler  was  not  actively  interested  in  the  success  of  the  ne 
gotiation.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  he  deserves  a  large  share 
of  the  credit,  instead  of  the  scant  justice  he  has  received 
from  the  historians  of  that  period.80  Webster  expressed 
his  warm  regard  for  Tyler's  solicitude  in  the  success  of  the 
negotiation  in  the  following  note  of  August  24,  1842:  "I 
shall  never  speak  of  this  negotiation,  my  dear  sir,  which  I 
believe  is  destined  to  make  some  figure  in  the  history  of  the 
country,  without  doing  you  justice.  Your  steady  support 
and  confidence,  your  anxious  and  intelligent  attention  to 
what  was  in  progress,  your  exceedingly  obliging  and  pleas 
ant  intercourse  both  with  the  British  minister  and  the  com 
missioners  of  the  States,  have  given  every  facility  to  my 
agency  in  this  important  transaction."81 

Although  ratified  and  proclaimed,  the  treaty  was  yet  a 
target  for  vigorous  attacks  from  three  quarters.  It  was 
still  hoped  by  its  opponents  to  nullify  the  treaty  by  pre 
venting  the  laws  necessary  for  its  enforcement  from  being 
enacted.  In  the  United  States  Senate,  and  in  Parliament, 
long  debates  took  place  upon  the  treaty  of  Washington  dur 
ing  first  months  of  1843.  An  unexpected  opposition  came 

7»Gallatin  to  Thomas  Ritchie,  August  2,  1842.  Gallatin's  Writ 
ings,  Vol.  II. 

so  Foster,  J.  W.,  "A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,"  p.  283. 
si  Webster's  Private  Correspondence,"  Vol.  II,  p.  147. 


218  [46 

from  France.  Lewis  Cass,  the  United  States  minister  at 
Paris,  bitterly  resented  that  his  efforts  in  Europe  to  pre 
vent  an  adoption  of  the  right  of  search  were  not  more 
substantially  upheld  by  the  provisions  of  the  Webster-Ash- 
burton  Treaty.  Webster  successfully  upheld  the  action  of 
the  government  in  the  ensuing  correspondence  which  con 
tinued  after  Cass  had  resigned  his  post  on  account  of  his 
feelings  against  the  treaty.82 

The  political  opponents  found  an  excellent  opportunity 
to  attack  the  treaty  in  the  discussion  raised  by  a  circum 
stance  of  its  ratification.  This  was  the  notorious  question 
of  "The  Maps."83  When  the  negotiations  were  just  begin 
ning,  Jared  Sparks,  who  was  gathering  data  in  the  French 
archives  for  a  revision  of  his  work,  "The  Diplomatic  Cor 
respondence  of  the  American  Revolution,"  discovered  a  let 
ter  written  by  Franklin  to  Count  de  Vergermes,  in  which  he 
referred  to  a  certain  map  which  he  had  sent,  marked  with  a 
" strong  red  line"  to  show  the  boundaries  of  the  United 
States  as  settled  in  the  preliminary  draft  of  the  treaty  of 
1783.  On  further  search  he  discovered  a  map,  answering 
accurately  the  description  given  by  Franklin,  on  which  the 
line  marked  for  the  boundary  coincided  with  that  claimed 
by  England.84  Mr.  Sparks  immediately  sent  a  copy  of  this 
map  to  Webster  with  an  explanatory  letter  concerning  it. 
Nothing  more  was  heard  of  this  letter  or  of  its  contents  un 
til  after  the  treaty  was  signed  by  the  negotiators.  Then, 
while  the  Senate  was  debating  the  ratification  of  the  treaty, 
Webster  gave  a  copy  of  Sparks'  letter  and  the  map  to  Mr. 
Rives,  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
and  it  was  published  in  Mr.  Rives'  speech.  As  soon  as 
the  treaty  was  ratified  and  the  fact  became  known  that 
Webster  had  withheld  the  information  conveyed  by  Sparks ' 


82  Webster  'a  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  pp.  170-221. 

83  A  full  and  complete  account  of  the  Maps  is  given  in  < '  North 
American  Keview,"  1843,  Vol.  LVI,  pp.  468-477. 

84  Jared  Sparks  to  Buchanan,  February  11,  1843.     Curtis:  "Life 
of  Buchanan, ' '  Vol.  I,  p.  505. 


47]  219 

letter  while  the  treaty  was  being  negotiated,  a  stir  of  ex 
citement  was  raised.  Webster  was  charged  with  having 
taken  an  unfair  advantage  of  the  British  negotiator  in 
withholding  evidence  bearing  upon  the  question,  which 
he  was  duty  bound  to  make  known.  This  charge  of  dis 
honorable  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
was  enforced  by  the  fact  that  Sparks'  letter  had  been  used 
to  secure  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  the  Senate.85  This 
feeling  was  strongest  in  England,  but  was  also  entertained 
by  some  people  in  the  United  States. 

A  fair  judgment  of  the  case,  however,  shows  that  Web 
ster's  conduct  in  regard  to  the  Sparks  map  was  not  such  as 
his  opponents  declared.86  Rives'  speech  upon  the  Sparks 
documents  did  not  imply  that  they  in  any  way  affected  the 
validity  of  either  claim,  ''but,"  he  said,  "they  could  not 
fail  in  event  of  another  reference,  to  give  increased  confi 
dence  and  emphasis  to  the  pretensions  of  Great  Britain,  and 
exert  a  corresponding  influence  upon  the  mind  of  the  ar 
biter."  There  is  little  doubt,  in  view  of  the  conflicting 
probabilities  to  be  drawn  from  the  number  of  maps  relat 
ing  to  the  boundary,  that  if  the  discoveries  of  Mr.  Sparks 
had  been  made  known  at  the  time  they  were  communicated 
to  Webster,  the  only  result  would  have  been  the  addition 
of  endless  perplexities  and  a  possible  disruption  of  the  ne 
gotiation.87  But  in  the  midst  of  popular  interest  and  possi- 

85  A  private  letter  of  Webster  to  Everett,  July  14,  1842,  shows 
that  Webster  did  take  precautions  to  keep  the  map  question  quiet. 
He  says  to  Everett :  ' l  *  *  *  forbear  to  press  the  search  for  maps 
in  England  or  elsewhere.  Our  strength  is  on  the  letter  of  the  treaty." 
Curtis:  "Life  of  Webster,"  Vol.  II,  p.  103. 

se  "Defense  of  Webster,"  E.  Everett,  in  "Orations  and  Speech 
es,"  Vol.  IV,  p.  213. 

87  Webster  and  Ashburton  both  expressed  their  satisfaction  with 
the  results  accomplished  by  keeping  the  map  question  out  of  the  ne 
gotiations.  Webster,  before  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  April 
15,  1843,  said:  "I  must  confess  that  I  did  not  think  it  a  very  urgent 
duty  to  go  to  Lord  Ashburton  and  tell  him  that  I  had  found  a  bit  of 
doubtful  evidence  in  Paris  out  of  which  he  might  perhaps  make  some 
thing  to  prejudice  our  claims."  Webster's  Works,  Vol.  II,  p.  149. 
Ashburton  wrote  to  Webster  that,  "he  was  by  no  means  disposed  to 
disturb  its  (the  map  question's)  sleep."  See  Appendix  C.  (3). 


220  [48 

ble  antagonism,  raised  by  the  map  question,  the  discussion 
of  the  treaty  was  renewed  in  the  Senate  and  Parliament. 
The  debates  which  ensued  brought  forth  the  severest  kind 
of  criticism  both  for  the  treaty  and  its  negotiators,  but  re 
sulted  finally  in  a  complete  vindication  of  both. 

In  the  Senate  a  discussion  was  brought  about  by  a 
dispatch  of  Mr.  Everett  received  February  23rd,  in  which 
a  reference  was  made  to  the  right  of  search  and  to  the  state 
ment  made  by  Sir  Robert  Peel,  that  Lord  Aberdeen's  dis 
cussion  of  it  in  a  dispatch  to  Everett,  December  20,  1841, 
had  not  been  answered  by  the  United  States.  It  had  been 
asserted  in  England  that  the  claims  which  Aberdeen  laid 
down  in  his  dispatch  of  December  20th,  to  the  right  of 
search,  or,  as  explained  by  Aberdeen,  "The  right  to  ascer 
tain  the  truth  of  a  vessel's  nationality,"  had  never  been 
denied  in  the  United  States  and  were  in  fact  undeniable.88 
The  real  reason  why  Aberdeen's  dispatch  had  not  been  an 
swered  was  that  negotiations  had  been  transferred  to  the 
Special  Mission  before  Everett  framed  a  reply.  The  sub 
ject  having  been  brought  before  the  Senate  in  such  a  man 
ner,  Mr.  Benton  made  a  long  speech  upon  the  different  in 
terpretations  put  upon  the  treaty  in  the  two  countries,  and 
argued  that  for  just  such  indefmiteness  none  of  the  real 
questions  between  the  countries  had  been  settled  by  the  re 
cent  negotiations.89  He  was  answered  by  Mr.  Archer,  who 
declared  that  the  misunderstandings  were  more  apparent 
than  real.  He  (Archer)  said  that  although  England  had 
not  actually  given  up  the  right  of  visit,  yet  the  treaty  had 
removed  the  cause  for  its  immediate  exercise  and  was  there 
for  a  solution  of  the  question. 

The  opposition  to  the  treaty  in  the  United  States  was 
not  confined  to  the  right  of  search.  Mr.  Benton  criticized 
all  of  its  provisions  and  added  that  one  of  the  greatest  faults 


ss  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  68,  pp.  615,  621. 
89  Benton :  < '  Thirty  Years  View  in  the  IT.  S.  Senate, ' '  Vol.  II,  pp. 
421,  451. 


49]  221 

was  that  it  did  not  settle  all  the  questions  it  was  supposed 
to  include.  One  of  these  was  the  question  of  Oregon,  which 
was  beginning  to  attract  settlers  to  such  an  extent  that  it 
was  felt  that  the  arrangement  for  its  joint  occupation  by 
the  two  countries  should  be  terminated.90 

In  Parliament  the  treaty  was  brought  up  for  discussion 
by  a  resolution  of  Lord  Palmerston  calling  for  the  corre 
spondence  of  the  recent  negotiation  and  the  instructions  of 
the  ministry  to  the  British  envoy  to  be  laid  before  the  House 
of  Commons.  In  his  subsequent  speech  upon  the  motion  he 
made  a  detailed  and  searching  criticism  of  the  treaty,  its 
negotiation,  and  England's  representative  in  the  negotia 
tions.91  He  reviewed  the  history  of  the  boundary  question 
from  its  beginning  in  1783,  to  the  negotiations  of  Lord  Ash- 
burton;  then  proceeded  to  attack  those  negotiations  upon 
all  the  points  connected  with  them.  He  considered  the 
choice  of  Lord  Ashburton  as  negotiator  a  great  mistake  and 
one  which  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  weakness  and 
lack  of  skill  shown  in  the  negotiations.  The  concessions  of 
territory  to  the  United  States  he  considered  for  the  most 
part  as  absolute  losses  to  England  for  which  no  compen 
sating  equivalents  were  gained.  The  8th  and  9th  articles 
of  the  treaty  were  not  a  fulfillment  of  the  promise  of  the 
governments  in  the  Treaty  of  Ghent  "to  use  their  best  en 
deavors,"  to  end  slavery,  since  efficient  policing  of  the  sea 
against  slave  traders  was  only  possible  by  a  mutual  right  of 
search.  In  regard  to  the  "Creole,"  Palmerston  held  that 

90  In  regard  to  the  Oregon  question  and  its  connection  with  the 
treaty  of  Washington,  a  mistaken  belief  has  been  circulated  that 
Marcus  Whitman,  the  missionary,  by  a  heroic  trip  across  the  continent 
to  tell  the  national  authorities  of  Oregon's  value,  saved  that  territory 
from  being  traded  to  England  for  a  cod  fishery,  in  the  Webster- 
Ashburton  negotiation.  This  story  has  been  conclusively  proved  to  be 
an  entire  fabrication,  but  many  notable  writers  were  taken  in  by  it, 
among  others  being  Von  Hoist,  who  says  in  his  ' '  Constitutional  His 
tory  of  the  United  States,"  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  51,  52,  "How  much  truth 
is  in  the  story  can  probably  never  be  authentically  determined. ' '  The 
proofs  of  the  story's  lack  of  foundation  are  found  in  Edw.  G. 
Bourne's,  "Essays  in  Historical  Criticism." 

»i  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  67,  pp.  1162,  1216. 


222  [50 

Ashburton  gave  too  much  countenance  to  the  doctrines  of 
Webster,  in  promising  that  instructions  should  be  sent  to  the 
colonial  governors  to  prevent  such  ' '  officious  interferences ' ' 
in  the  future.  The  extradition  article  alone  escaped  the 
general  condemnation  of  Lord  Palmerston.  This  he  be 
lieved  to  be  a  sound  principle  of  international  relations 
which  would  be  properly  enforced  by  the  two  governments 
for  their  mutual  benefit.  But  on  the  whole,  Palmerston 
regarded  the  treaty  as  no  definite  assurance  of  future  peace. 
Its  agreements  were  either  already  bad  or  more  capable  of 
misconstruction  than  of  satisfactory  enforcement.  This 
long  arraignment  by  Palmerston,  which  occupied  more  than 
three  hours  in  its  delivery,  was  concluded  with  a  hope  that 
the  forebodings  which  had  been  expressed  would  prove 
wrong. 

Sir  Robert  Peel  replied  to  Palmerston 's  attack  with  an 
able  defense  of  the  entire  course  of  the  government  in  the 
recent  negotiations.  He  emphasized  the  fact  that  some 
thing  had  at  last  been  accomplished.  The  Special  Mission 
and  Ashburton 's  "undiplomatic  and  unskillful"  negotia 
tions  had  settled  questions  which  Palmerston,  with  formal 
diplomacy,  had  tried  for  ten  years  to  determine,  without 
success.  The  misconstructions  put  upon  the  treaty  by  its 
opponents  were  not  founded  upon  any  actual  misunder 
standing  between  the  governments  regarding  the  under 
lying  principles  it  embodied.  Neither  side  had  sacrificed 
any  principle  which  it  had  held,  nor  suffered  any  material 
losses  in  territory.  The  failure  to  negotiate  upon  the  Or 
egon  question  was  attributed  to  the  danger  of  complete  fail 
ure  if  too  many  difficulties  were  added  to  those  already  de 
manding  settlement.  The  charge  of  misconduct  on  the  part 
of  the  negotiators  recently  raised  by  the  map  question  was 
erroneous.  Even  if  Webster  had  produced  the  Sparks  map 
— which  he  was  not  bound  to  do — nothing  would  have  been 
proved  by  it.  The  British  government  had  recently  dis 
covered  a  map,  which  belonged  to  the  King,  George  III., 


51]  223 

and  on  which  the  boundary,  stated  to  be  the  line  "as  de 
scribed  by  Mr.  Oswald,"  the  British  negotiator  in  1783, 
was  shown  as  claimed  by  the  United  States.  It  was  clear 
that  the  maps  proved  nothing  toward  one  claim  or  the  oth 
er.  Peel  concluded  that  the  fact  that  no  one  dared  to  move 
any  open  censure  or  blame  of  Ashburton,  was  proof  of  the 
universal  satisfaction  with  his  conduct. 

The  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons,  besides  the  two 
speeches  already  mentioned,  included  others  by  Mr.  Macaul- 
ay  and  Sir  Charles  Napier  in  opposition,  and  Sir  H.  Doug 
las  and  Mr.  Disraeli  in  support  of  the  treaty.  On  March 
23rd,  when  the  question  was  again  called  up,  it  having  been 
adjourned  the  day  before  by  a  call  of  order  for  lack  of  a 
quorum,  Mr.  Hume  gave  notice  of  the  following  resolution : 

"That  the  House,  looking  to  the  long  protracted  nego 
tiations  between  the  government  of  this  country  and  that 
of  the  United  States  of  North  America  as  to  the  settlement 
of  the  northeastern  boundary,  and  taking  into  consideration 
the  state  of  our  foreign  relations  in  October,  1841,  is  of  the 
opinion  that  the  treaty  of  Washington  is  alike  honorable 
and  advantageous  to  each  of  the  high  contracting  parties, 
and  that  the  thanks  of  the  House  are  due  to  the  ministers 
who  advised,  as  well  as  to  the  Rt.  Hon.  Lord  Ashburton,  who 
negotiated  and  concluded  that  treaty. '  '°2 

This  resolution  of  thanks  was  passed  in  the  House  of 
Commons  on  May  2nd  by  a  large  majority.  Meanwhile  the 
House  of  Lords  had  debated  a  similar  motion,  made  by 
Lord  Brougham,  and  accepted  it,  April  7th.93 

The  result  of  the  debates  in  Parliament  bore  out  the  be 
lief  of  Ashburton,  that  the  opposition  to  the  treaty  lay 
chiefly  among  political  enemies  of  the  ministry.94  It  also 
foreshadowed  the  ultimate  success  of  the  treaty,  in  that  it 
showed  a  disposition  in  Parliament  to  carry  out  its  provi 
sions. 


92  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  67,  p.  1317. 

93  IUd.,  Vol.  68,  pp.  632,  818. 

94  See  Appendix  C.     (2). 


224  [52 

Lord  Ashburton  replied  to  an  inquiry  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  February  9,  1843,  concerning  the  10th  article  of  the 
treaty,  that  he  had  written  to  Webster  of  the  necessity  of  an 
act  of  Parliament  to  confirm  that  article  in  England.95  A 
bill  for  this  purpose  was  introduced  by  Ashburton  in  June, 
1843,  and  finally  passed  August  22nd.  In  the  debate  upon 
it,  there  was  still  an  inclination  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 
members  to  confuse  the  extradition  article  with  an  attempt 
by  the  United  States  to  recover  fugitive  slaves.  This  mis 
take  was  rectified  by  Lord  Aberdeen,  who  disclaimed  any 
possibility  of  such  an  interpretation  of  the  article  ever  being 
enforced.96 

In  the  United  States  the  bill  for  carrying  into  effect  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  was  passed  in  the  House  of  Repre 
sentatives,  February  28,  1843,  by  a  vote  of  137  to  40.  The 
Senate  adopted  it  March  2nd,  without  division,  upon  the 
report  of  the  Committee  of  Foreign  Relations,  of  which  Mr. 
Archer  was  the  chairman. 

The  final  work  of  putting  the  treaty  into  force  was  com 
pleted  by  the  joint  survey  commission,  appointed  under  the 
sixth  article.  The  report  of  this  Commission  was  received 
January  28,  1847. 97  It  showed  that  the  line  was  success 
fully  marked  and  surveyed  from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix 
to  the  intersection  of  the  forty-fifth  parallel  with  the  St. 
Lawrence,  three  hundred  men  having  been  occupied  for 
eighteen  months  to  complete  the  work.  Perfect  harmony 
prevailed  between  the  commissioners  and  nothing  was  en 
countered  throughout  the  work  to  cause  any  difference  be 
tween  them  regarding  the  determination  of  the  line.  With 
the  adoption  of  the  report  of  the  Joint  Commission  of  the 

»s  See  Appendix  A.     (5)  6. 

9G  Shortly  before  leaving  America,  at  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty, 
Ashburton  had  assured  a  delegation  of  the  American  and  Foreign 
Anti-Slavery  Society  that  care  would  be  taken  that  the  provision  of 
the  10th  article  should  not  prejudice  the  cause  of  anti-slavery.  Niles 
Eegister,  Vol.  63,  p.  53. 

97  Senate  Executive  Documents,  30th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  Doc.  No.  71, 
Vol.  VIII,  p.  3. 


53]  225 

Boundary  the  last  step  was  taken  in  the  negotiation  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington  of  1842. 

III.  THE  EFFECTS  OF  THE  TREATY. 

Having  seen  the  causes  which  led  to  the  negotiation  of 
the  Webster-Ashburton  Treaty,  and  the  way  in  which  that 
treaty  was  drawn  up  and  incorporated  into  the  laws  of  the 
two  countries,  the  final  chapter  of  its  history  is  concerned 
with  a  retrospective  view  of  its  effects.  What  has  been  the 
effect  of  this  treaty  upon  the  political  and  legal  relations  of 
the  countries  with  which  it  is  directly  connected,  and  what 
has  been  its  effect  and  significance  in  the  relations  of  na 
tions  generally  ?  These  are  the  questions  to  be  answered  by 
our  final  review  of  its  history. 

The  treaty  of  Washington  of  1842  included  twelve  ar 
ticles,  in  which  three  questions,  exclusive  of  explanatory 
and  ratification  provisions,  are  included.  In  articles  I.  to 
VII  inclusive,  the  settlement  of  the  boundary  between  the 
United  States  and  England's  North  American  Provinces  is 
provided  for.  The  eighth  and  ninth  articles  are  concerned 
with  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  and  the  tenth  with 
the  extradition  of  criminals,  fugitive  from  justice,  for  seven 
enumerated  offenses.  In  addition  to  these  questions  cer 
tain  others  are  included  in  the  official  diplomatic  corre 
spondence,  whose  close  connection  with  the  causes  and  ne 
gotiation  of  the  treaty  give  them  a  partial  relation  to  its 
historic  effects,  although  they  are  not  a  part  of  its  provi 
sions.  Primarily,  however,  the  treaty  deals  with  but  three 
subjects  as  just  enumerated. 

The  question  of  the  boundary  settlement  has  little  or  no 
bearing  upon  international  relations  except  as  between  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain.  But  between  these  two 
nations  its  importance  is  two-fold.  In  the  first  place,  be 
cause  of  its  termination  of  the  disorders  and  conflicts  of 
jurisdiction  on  the  frontier,  which  prevented  the  adminis 
tration  of  justice  and  threatened  the  peace  of  the  two  na- 


226  [54 

tions;  and  secondly,  for  the  military  and  commercial  sig 
nificance  of  the  new  boundary. 

The  relation  of  the  boundary  question  to  the  interna 
tional  peace  of  the  United  States  and  England  has  been 
noticed  as  one  of  the  leading  causes  of  the  negotiation  of 
the  Webster-Ashburton  treaty.98  It  was  the  one  question 
which  had  hung  over  the  two  countries  in  constant  dispute 
since  1783.  Other  questions  had  remained  unsettled  as 
long  as  had  the  boundary,  such  as  the  right  of  search,  but 
none  had  been  so  continually  agitated  or  so  long  in  actual 
suspense.  The  very  length  of  time  during  which  this  ques 
tion  had  remained  unsettled  had  made  it  a  sore  point  of 
difference  between  the  two  countries.  But  since  the  settle 
ment  of  the  frontier  had  started  disorders  and  friction  be 
tween  the  local  authorities,  a  very  practical  danger  was  em 
bodied  in  the  unsettled  boundary  question.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  had  become  the  factor  which  embittered  all 
disputes  arising  between  the  two  governments.  Its  settle 
ment  therefor  was  of  great  importance  to  them  both. 

The  line  of  the  boundary  as  laid  down  in  the  Webster- 
Ashburton  Treaty,  articles  I  and  II  secured  a  settlement 
which  was  satisfactory  and  definite.  It  was  satisfactory 
to  neither  side  from  the  standpoint  of  their  respective 
claims,  but  as  the  termination  of  an  aggravated  and  dan 
gerous  dispute  it  was  a  compromise  which  secured  to  both 
parties  the  essential  features  of  their  contentions,  and  thus 
allowed  a  peaceable  adjustment  of  their  relations.  Articles 
IV,  V,  VI,  and  X  of  the  treaty  dealt  with  the  adjustment 
of  territorial  jurisdiction  to  conform  to  the  new  boundary 
and  provided  for  a  peaceable  administration  of  law  on  the 
frontier.  They  were  all  carried  into  effect  without  diffi 
culty,  thus  definitely  terminating  the  frontier  disputes 
which  had  become  almost  a  frontier  war. 

The  commercial  and  military  significance  of  the  new 
boundary  were  important  points  of  discussion  in  both  coun- 


98  See  Part  I.     (1). 


55]  227 

tries  during  the  debates  upon  the  treaty.  Its  military  im 
portance  was  particularly  emphasized  and  for  good  reason. 
The  feelings  between  the  two  nations  at  that  time  were  not 
yet  firmly  established  on  a  peace  basis  and  more  considera 
tion  was  given  to  the  possibilities  of  another  war  than  at 
the  present  day.  Rouse's  Point  and  the  Highland  frontier, 
therefore,  were  important  questions  in  the  boundary  settle 
ment.  The  advantages  which  resulted  seem  to  have  been 
about  equally  divided.  Rouse's  Point  was  returned  to  the 
United  States  and  the  Highland  frontier,  from  the  source  of 
the  St.  Francis  to  Metjarmette,  went  to  Great  Britain.  Each 
country  gained  a  point  which  was  more  conducive  to  its  own 
welfare  than  to  the  others'  detriment.  Rouse's  Point  in 
commanding  the  entrance  to  Lake  Champlain  was  much 
more  important  as  a  strategic  point  of  defense  for  the 
United  States  than  it  would  be  for  Canada.  Similarly  the 
Highland  frontier  was  more  essential  for  the  defense  of 
Canada  than  for  the  United  States,  since  it  bordered  close 
ly  on  the  St.  Lawrence,  the  highway  of  England's  colonial 
communications. 

The  military  possibilities  of  the  boundary,  however,  have 
never  been  tested  and  there  is  no  longer  the  old  hostile 
feeling  between  the  two  countries  to  cause  much  anxiety 
in  that  regard.  But  the  commercial  possibilities  of  the 
boundary  settlement  have  been  actually  realized.  The  free 
navigation  of  the  St.  John  as  provided  in  the  3rd  article 
proved  to  be  an  important  concession  to  the  lumber  interests 
in  Maine"  as  well  as  to  promote  a  general  good  feeling  in 
the  commercial  intercourse  between  the  countries.  In  ar 
ticle  VII  a  correction,  for  commercial  advantages,  was 
made  in  the  boundary  settled  under  the  Treaty  of  Ghent. 
The  original  description  of  the  boundaries  said  that  the  line 
along  the  St.  Lawrence  should  be  "through  the  middle  of 


as  Under  the  4th  article  of  the  treaty  of  June  5th,  1854,  it  was 
agreed  that  no  export  duty  should  be  charged  on  American  timber 
floated  down  the  St.  John,  and  shipped  from  New  Brunswick.  ' '  Trea 
ties  and  Conventions,"  p.  452. 


228  [56 

that  river, ' '  and  it  had  been  determined  so  by  the  commis 
sioners  of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent.  It  was  found,  however, 
that  the  navigable  channel  of  the  river  was  not  always  the 
middle  of  the  stream  and  that  in  several  cases,  mentioned 
in  article  VII  of  the  Treaty  of  Washington,  the  only  safe 
ship  channel  was  within  the  territory  of  one  of  the  nations. 
Provision  was  made  therefore  for  the  free  navigation  of 
such  channels  by  the  ships  of  both  countries.100 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  questions  of  right  of  search 
and  impressment  were  settled  by  the  treaty  of  Washington 
of  1842.  This  is  not  true  in  any  strict  sense  of  the  word. 
In  fact,  the  only  thing  which  was  accomplished  by  this 
treaty,  at  all  connected  with  the  right  of  search,  was  a  re 
moval  of  the  immediate  occasion  for  its  exercise.  The 
question  of  right  of  search  had  been  brought  up  in  con 
nection  with  the  suppression  of  the  slave  trade,  and  since 
the  provisions  for  independent  squadrons  eliminated  the 
necessity  of  a  right  of  search  in  accomplishing  that  pur 
pose,101  it  was  considered  that  the  question  was  practically 
settled.  As  Palmerston  said,  the  provision  for  a  sufficient 
naval  force  by  the  United  States  to  stop  American  ships 
from  engaging  in  the  slave  trade,  "was  practically  equiv 
alent  to  the  acknowledgment  of  a  power  which  we  did  not 
abandon  in  words,  but  it  would  be  understood  we  should 
not  attempt  to  exercise."102  The  principle  of  right  of 
search  was  not  touched  by  this  treaty  which  operated  mere 
ly  as  a  suspension  of  the  questions  and  not  as  an  actual  set 
tlement. 

100  in  international  law,  river  boundaries  are  interpreted  to  be  the 
middle  of  the  main  channel,  or  "thread  of  the  stream/'  unless  other 
wise  stipulated  by  treaty.     "Wm.  Butteruth,  et  al.  v.  The  St.  Louis 
Bridge    Co."    (123    Illinois    535)— Scott's    "Cases   in    International 
Law,"  p.  121.     The  Treaty  of  Washington  avoided  the  mistake  of 
stipulating  "middle  of  the  stream."     By  it,  the  boundary  along  the 
St.  John  is  described  as  the  "middle  of  the  channel."     The  final 
opening  of  the  entire  river  St.  Lawrence  for  free  navigation  by  the 
ships  of  both  countries   was   not   accomplished  until   1871.     Taylor: 
"International  Public  Law,"  p.  286. 

101  See  Appendix  B,  The  Treaty,  Art.  VIII. 

102  Bulwer,  Life  of  Palmerston,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  63. 


57]  229 

The  right  of  impressment  is  one  which  England  has 
never  abandoned  in  any  official  declaration.  Its  practical 
abandonment,  however,  has  caused  it  to  be  considered  as  set 
tled.  Its  only  connection  with  the  treaty  of  Washington, 
1842,  is  entirely  secondary.  It  was  believed  in  1841  that 
the  demand  of  England  for  the  right  of  search  might  be 
associated,  as  it  was  before  the  war  of  1812,  with  the  right 
to  take  seamen  from  American  merchant  ships,  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  deserters.  This  led  Webster  to 
address  correspondence  to  Lord  Ashburton,  setting  forth 
the  reasons  for  the  United  States'  opposition  to  impress 
ment,  and  the  stand  they  would  take  against  it  all  future 
time.103  Ashburton 's  reply  agreed  with  Webster's  views 
and  gave  assurance  that  there  would  never  arise  another 
occasion  for  its  exercise.  But  Ashburton  did  not  feel  em 
powered  to  negotiate  any  treaty  stipulations  upon  this  ques 
tion.  It  has  remained  undenied  by  England  except  by  the 
semi-official  renunciation  of  Lord  Ashburton. 

But  the  effects  of  the  provisions  for  independent  squad- 
drons  to  patrol  the  African  Coast  were  felt  in  Europe  as 
well  as  in  the  United  States.  England  had  advocated  a 
mutual  right  of  search  as  a  necessary  measure  in  suppres 
sing  the  slave  trade,  and  by  her  efforts  a  treaty  for  this 
purpose  had  been  negotiated  by  five  of  the  European  na 
tions.  England,  France,  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia  were 
the  parties  to  this  Quintuple  Treaty.  It  was  ratified  by  all 
except  France,  who  was  still  debating  the  ratification  when 
Webster  and  Ashburton  began  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty 
of  Washington.  The  United  States  had  not  been  asked  to 
become  a  party  to  the  Quintuple  Treaty,  but  it  was  under 
stood  that  this  request  would  be  made  as  soon  as  the  orig 
inal  contracting  parties  should  ratify  it.104  Vigorous  pro 
tests  against  the  right  of  search  and  the  adoption  of  the 
Quintuple  Treaty  were  made  in  Europe  by  Mr.  Wheaton, 


103  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  p.  95. 

104  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  67,  p.  1205. 


230  [58 

the  United  States  Minister  to  Prussia,  and  by  General  Cass, 
the  Minister  at  Paris.  The  efforts  of  these  men  were  main 
ly  responsible  for  the  rejection  of  the  treaty  by  France,105 
and  when  the  treaty  of  1842  was  announced  the  Quintuple 
treaty  was  definitely  abandoned.  Its  opponents  pointed  to 
the  eighth  article  of  the  Webster-Ashburton  treaty  as  the 
real  solution  of  the  difficulty.106 

In  securing  even  the  temporary  elimination  of  the  ques 
tion  of  right  of  search  from  the  disputes  between  the  two 
countries,  Webster  and  Ashburton  achieved  success  to  a 
certain  degree.  In  the  critical  state  of  the  international 
relations  at  that  time,  a  practical  settlement  of  this  old 
question  by  removing  the  temporary  cause  for  its  agitation, 
was  a  wise  and  effective  measure.  But  the  fact  of  its  being 
only  a  postponement,  and  not  a  settlement  of  the  principle 
involved,  is  well  borne  out  by  the  subsequent  history  of 
the  right  of  search  and  its  significance  in  the  United  States 
at  a  later  date.107 

In  striking  at  the  causes  rather  than  at  the  effects  of 
the  disputes  between  the  two  countries,  Webster  and  Ash- 
burton  were  particularly  successful  in  their  selection  of  the 
subject  of  extradition  of  criminals,  fugitive  from  justice, 
for  the  tenth  article  of  the  treaty.  John  Bassett  Moore  has 
well  expressed  the  good  effects  of  extradition  laws  in  gen 
eral,  as  follows :  "No  innovation  in  the  practice  of  nations 
has  ever  more  completely  discredited  the  woeful  predictions 
of  its  adversaries  than  that  of  surrendering  fugitives  from 

105  Lawrence,  Introduction  to  Wheaton  7s  International  Law,  p.  120. 
Also  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  pp.  170,  221. 

ice  Parliamentary  Debates,  3rd  Series,  Vol.  67,  p.  1266. 

107  l '  Apart  from  the  case  of  piracy,  executions  of  revenue  laws, 
and  proper  cause  for  self-defense,  the  right  of  visit  in  time  of  peace 
may  be  said  to  have  ended  in  1858,  when  England  abandoned  it,  after 
a  strong  protest  by  the  United  States  Senate,  caused  England  sta 
tioning  cruisers  near  the  island  of  Cuba  to  stop  slave  trading." 
Taylor,  International  Public  Law,  p.  239  and  310,  note.  Also  Philli- 
more,  International  Law,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  543.  In  1862  the  United  States 
concluded  a  treaty  with  England  for  the  mutual  exercise  of  the  right 
of  search,  within  certain  limits,  by  public  vessels  of  the  two  countries 
duly  authorized  for  the  work.  ' l  Treaties  and  Conventions, ' '  p.  454. 


59]  231 

justice."108  In  1842,  international  laws  of  extradition  were 
yet  an  innovation,  almost  untried  before  the  adoption  of  the 
Webster- Ashburton  treaty.  The  only  previous  attempt  to 
pass  extradition  laws  in  the  United  States  was  in  Jay's 
treaty  of  1794,  which  provided  in  its  27th  article  for  the 
extradition  of  criminals  fugitive  from  justice  in  cases  of 
murder  or  forgery.  Nothing  ever  came  of  this  attempt, 
however,  and  it  expired  by  limitation,  1808.109  Since  then 
the  governments  had  extradited  criminals  in  some  cases  as 
an  act  of  comity,  but  no  effective  rule  of  extradition  was 
adopted.  The  necessity  for  such  a  regulation  was  forced 
upon  the  attention  of  the  two  governments  in  1834,  when 
the  following  reply  was  sent  by  Mr.  Forsyth  to  a  request 
for  the  surrender  of  Andrew  Cawlin,  charged  with  murder 
in  England:  ''I  have  the  honor,  by  his  (the  President's) 
directions  to  reply,  that  in  absence  of  any  conventional 
agreement  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  for 
the  delivery  of  persons  charged  with  heinous  offenses,  the 
authority  of  the  executive  of  the  United  States  to  exercise 
a  right  of  such  important  effect  upon  the  personal  security, 
is  more  than  questionable,  and  hence  the  case  to  which  you 
refer  is  without  any  remedy  in  the  competency  of  this 
government  to  apply."110  The  opinions,  both  of  attorney- 
generals  and  courts,  decided  that  in  absence  of  treaty  stip 
ulations  the  executive  authority  in  the  United  States  was 
not  authorized  to  extradite  a  person  for  offenses  committed 
in  a  foreign  country.  This  gave  unbounded  opportunity 
for  criminals  to  operate  between  the  United  States  and 
Canada  with  little  fear  of  being  punished.  A  considerable 
share  of  the  border  disturbances  finally  resulting  in  the 
"Caroline"  affair  was  due  to  these  law  beaters,  who  in 
fested  the  boundary.  The  tenth  article  of  the  Webster- 

108  Moore,  J.  B.,  American  Diplomacy,  p.  253. 

loo  Lawrence,  Introduction  to  Wheaton's  International  Law,  p. 
cxiii.  Cf.  Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  p.  252. 

no  Moore,  J.  B.,  Treatise  on  Extradition  and  Inter-State  Kendition, 
p.  31. 


232  [60 

Ashburton  Treaty  was  intended  to  put  a  stop  to  such  law 
lessness  on  the  border  and  to  promote  the  general  cause  of 
justice  by  providing  for  extradition  upon  seven  offenses.111 

This  article  was  well  received  by  some  of  the  opponents 
of  the  treaty,  but  vigorously  attacked  by  others,  particu 
larly  in  England  where  it  was  confused  with  the  mistaken 
idea  that  the  ' '  Creole ' '  claims  applied  to  the  extradition  of 
fugitive  slaves.  The  distinction  between  the  two  was  made 
clear  in  Aberdeen's  speech  upon  the  bill  for  carrying  the 
article  into  effect.112  In  the  Senate,  Benton  said,  "Though 
fair  on  its  face,  it  is  difficult  of  execution."  He  feared 
that  with  its  large  number  of  numerated  offenses,  it  would 
be  misused  to  secure  the  punishment  of  innocent  persons 
and  political  offenders.113  In  the  House,  Mr.  Levy,  of 
Florida,  made  a  motion  and  speech  in  March,  1844,  for  the 
abandonment  of  the  extradition  article  on  the  ground  that 
England  was  not  executing  her  part  of  the  agreement  in 
refusing  to  extradite  seven  negroes,  who  had  committed  a 
murder  and  escaped  to  Nassau.  Nothing  resulted  from  this 
motion. 

In  spite  of  the  "woeful  predictions  of  its  adversaries," 
the  extradition  article  proved  its  effectiveness  in  securing 
order  on  the  frontier.  The  results  of  its  enforcement  were 
highly  commended  by  Mr.  Woodbridge,  a  former  governor 
of  Michigan,  who  spoke  during  Webster's  defense  of  the 
Treaty  of  Washington,  before  the  Senate,  April,  1846,11* 
as  follows:  "I  have  now  only  to  add  my  entire  and  un 
qualified  conviction,  that  no  act  of  the  legislative  or  treaty- 
making  power,  that  I  have  ever  known,  has  ever  been  more 
successful  in  its  operation  than  this  article  of  the  treaty; 
nor  could  any  provision  have  been  attended  by  more  happy 
consequences  upon  the  peace  and  safety  of  society  in  that 
remote  frontier."115 


in  See  Appendix  B. 

112  See  Part  II.     (3). 

us  Benton,  Thirty  Years'  View  in  the  IT.  S.  Senate,  p.  444. 

114  Webster's  Works,  Vol.  V,  p.  78. 

us  Webster's  Diplomatic  and  Official  Papers,  p.  295. 


61]  233 

In  the  history  of  extradition  the  treaty  of  Washington 
holds  an  important  position.  Although  it  was  not  the 
initial  step  in  the  development  of  the  process  of  extradition 
in  modern  times,  its  inception  in  1842  gave  great  strength 
to  that  movement  and  to  the  underlying  conception  of 
legality  in  International  Relations.116  In  its  relation  to  the 
history  of  extradition,  we  can  see  the  treaty  in  its  most 
characteristic  feature  as  a  result  of  modern  American  diplo 
macy.  Its  practicality,  its  legal  foundation,  and  its  direct 
aim  at  the  causes  of  the  difficulty  which  it  sought  to  remedy, 
stamp  it  as  a  truly  modern  and  well  built  monument  in  the 
history  of  arbitration  and  international  peace. 


Moore,  American  Diplomacy,  p.  252. 


234  [62 


APPENDICES. 


APPENDIX  A. — Extracts  from  the  diplomatic  correspondence  relating 
to  the  negotiation  of  the  Webster- Ashburton  Treaty. 

APPENDIX  B. — The  treaty  concluded  at  Washington,  August  9,  1842, 
by  Lord  Ashburton  and  Daniel  Webster,  verbatim. 

APPENDIX  C. — Extracts  from  Webster's  Private  Correspondence. 

APPENDIX  D. — A  map  showing  the  various  lines  between  the  United 
States  and  the  British  Provinces. 


APPENDIX  A. 

Extracts  from  the  diplomatic  correspondence  relating  to  the  ne 
gotiation  of  the  Webster-Ashburton  Treaty. 

(1)  Edward  Everett  to  Webster,  London,  December  31,  1841. 

(2)  Webster  to  Everett,  Washington,  January  29,  1842. 

(3)  Webster   to    Governor   Fairfield,    Washington,   April    11, 

1842. 

(4)  Webster  to  the  Maine  Commissioners,  Washington,  July 

15,  1842. 

(5)  Lord  Ashburton  to  Webster,  Washington,  August  9,  1842. 

(1)  EDWARD  EVERETT  TO  WEBSTER. 
London,  December,  31,  1841. 


"At  a  late  hour  on  the  evening  of  the  26th,  I  received  a  note 
from  the  Earl  of  Aberdeen,  requesting  an  interview  for  the  follow 
ing  day,  when  I  met  him  at  the  Foreign  Office,  agreeably  to  the 
appointment.  After  one  or  two  general  remarks  upon  the  difficulty 
of  bringing  about  an  adjustment  of  the  points  of  controversy  be 
tween  the  governments,  by  a  continuance  of  the  discussions  hither 
to  carried  on,  he  said  that  her  majesty's  government  had  deter 
mined  to  take  a  decisive  step  toward  that  end,  by  sending  a  special 
minister  to  the  United  States,  with  a  full  power  to  make  a  final 
settlement  of  all  matters  in  dispute.  *  *  *  This  step  was  de 
termined  on  from  a  sincere  and  earnest  desire  to  bring  the  matter 
so  long  in  controversy  to  an  amicable  settlement;  and  if,  as  he  did 


63]  235 

not  doubt,  the  same  disposition  existed  at  Washington,  he  thought 
this  step  afforded  the  most  favorable,  and,  indeed,  the  only  means 
of  carrying  it  into  effect.  In  the  choice  of  the  individual  for  the 
mission,  Lord  Aberdeen  added,  that  he  had  been  mainly  influenced 
by  a  desire  to  select  a  person  who  would  be  peculiarly  acceptable 
in  the  United  States,  as  well  as  eminently  qualified  for  the  trust, 
and  that  he  persuaded  himself  he  had  found  one  who,  in  both  re 
spects,  was  all  that  could  be  wished.  He  then  named  Lord  Ash- 
burton,  who  had  consented  to  undertake  the  mission. 

Although  this  communication  was,  of  course,  wholly  unexpected 
to  me,  I  felt  no  hesitation  in  expressing  the  great  satisfaction  with 
which  I  received  it.  I  assured  Lord  Aberdeen  that  the  President 
had  nothing  more  at  heart  than  an  honorable  adjustment  of  the 
matters  in  discussion  between  the  two  countries;  that  I  was  per 
suaded  a  more  acceptable  selection  of  a  person  for  the  important 
mission  proposed  could  not  have  been  made;  and  that  I  anticipated 
the  happiest  results  from  this  overture. 

Lord  Aberdeen  rejoined  that  it  was  more  than  an  overture;  that 
Lord  Ashburton  would  go  with  full  powers  to  make  a  definite  ar 
rangement  on  every  point  in  discussion  between  the  two  countries. 
He  was  aware  of  the  difficulty  of  some  of  them,  particularly  what 
had  incorrectly  been  called  the  right  of  search,  which  he  deemed 
the  most  difficult  of  all;  but  he  was  willing  to  confide  this  and  all 
other  matters  in  controversy  to  Lord  Ashburton 's  discretion.  He 
added,  that  they  should  have  been  quite  willing  to  come  to  a  gen 
eral  arrangement  here,  but  they  supposed  I  had  not  full  powers  for 
such  a  purpose. 

This  measure  being  determined  on,  Lord  Aberdeen  said  he  pre 
sumed  it  would  be  hardly  worth  while  for  us  to  continue  the  cor 
respondence  here  on  matters  in  dispute  between  the  governments. 
Pie,  of  course,  was  quite  willing  to  consider  and  reply  to  any  state 
ment  I  might  think  proper  to  make  on  any  subject;  but,  pending 
the  negotiations  that  might  take  place  at  Washington,  he  supposed 
no  benefit  could  result  from  a  simultaneous  discussion  here." 


(2)  WEBSTER  TO  EVERETT. 
Washington,  January  29,  1841. 

"Your  dispatch  of  the  31st  of  December  announces  the  import 
ant  intelligence  of  an  intention  of  dispatching  a  special  minister 
from  England  to  the  United  States,  with  full  powers  to  settle 
every  matter  in  dispute  between  the  two  governments;  and  the 


236  [64 

President  directs  me  to  say,  that  he  regards  this  proceeding  as 
originating  in  an  entirely  amicable  spirit,  and  that  it  will  be  met, 
on  his  part,  with  perfectly  corresponding  sentiments.  The  high 
character  of  Lord  Ashburton  is  well  known  to  this  government; 
and  it  is  not  doubted  that  he  will  enter  on  the  duties  assigned  to 
him,  not  only  with  the  advantages  of  much  knowledge  and  experi 
ence  in  public  affairs,  but  with  a  true  desire  to  signalize  his  mis 
sion  by  assisting  to  place  the  peace  of  the  two  countries  on  a  per 
manent  basis.  He  will  be  received  with  the  respect  due  to  his  own 
character,  the  character  of  the  government  which  sends  him,  and 
the  high  importance,  to  both  countries,  of  the  subjects  intrusted 
to  his  negotiation. 

The  President  approves  your  conduct  in  not  pursuing  in  Eng 
land  the  discussion  of  questions  which  are  now  to  become  the  sub 
jects  of  negotiation  here." 

(3)  WEBSTER  TO  GOVERNOR  FAIRFIELD. 

Washington,  April  11,  1842. 
Department  of  State,  Washington,  April  11,  1842. 

"Your  excellency  is  aware  that,  previous  to  March,  1841,  a 
negotiation  had  been  going  on  for  some  time  between  the  Secretary 
of  State  of  the  United  States,  under  the  direction  of  the  President, 
and  the  British  minister  accredited  to  this  government,  having  for 
its  object  the  creation  of  a  joint  commission  for  settling  the  con 
troversy  respecting  the  northeastern  boundary  of  the  United  States, 
with  a  provision  for  an  ultimate  reference  to  arbitrators,  to  be  ap 
pointed  by  some  one  of  the  sovereigns  of  Europe,  in  case  an  ar 
bitration  should  become  necessary.  On  the  leading  features  of  a 
convention  for  this  purpose  the  two  governments  had  become 
agreed;  but  on  several  matters  of  detail  the  parties  differed,  and 
appear  to  have  been  interchanging  their  respective  views  and  opin 
ions,  projects,  and  counter-projects,  without  coming  to  any  final 
arrangement,  down  to  August,  1840.  Various  causes,  not  now 
necessary  to  be  explained,  arrested  the  progress  of  the  negotiation 
at  that  time,  and  no  considerable  advance  has  since  been  made  in  it. 

It  seems  to  have  been  understood  on  both  sides  that,  one  arbi 
tration  having  failed,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  two  parties  to  proceed 
to  institute  another,  according  to  the  spirit  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent 
and  other  treaties;  and  the  President  has  felt  it  to  be  his  duty,  un 
less  some  new  course  should  be  proposed,  to  cause  the  negotiation 
to  be  resumed,  and  pressed  to  its  conclusion.  But  I  have  now  to 
inform  your  excellency  that  Lord  Ashburton,  a  minister  plenipo 
tentiary  and  special,  has  arrived  at  the  seat  of  the  government  of 


65]  237 

the  United  States,  charged  with  full  powers  from  his  sovereign  to 
negotiate  and  settle  the  different  matters  in  discussion  between  the 
two  governments.  I  have  further  to  state  to  you,  that  he  has  offi 
cially  announced  to  this  department  that,  in  regard  to  the  bound 
ary  question,  he  has  authority  to  treat  for  a  conventional  line,  or 
line  by  agreement,  on  such  terms  and  conditions,  and  with  such 
mutual  considerations  and  equivalents,  as  may  be  thought  just  and 
equitable,  and  that  he  is  ready  to  enter  upon  a  negotiation  for  such 
conventional  line  so  soon  as  this  government  shall  say  it  is  author 
ized  and  ready,  on  its  part,  to  commence  such  negotiation. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  President  has  felt  it  to  be  his 
duty  to  call  the  serious  attention  of  the  governments  of  Maine  and 
Massachusetts  to  the  subject,  and  to  submit  to  those  governments 
the  propriety  of  their  co-operation,  to  a  certain  extent,  and  in  a 
certain  form,  in  an  endeavor  to  terminate  a  controversy  already 
of  so  long  duration,  and  which  seems  very  likely  to  be  still  con 
siderably  further  protracted  before  the  desired  end  of  a  final  ad 
justment  shall  be  attained,  unless  a  shorter  course  of  arriving  at 
that  end  be  adopted,  than  such  as  has  heretofore  been  pursued, 
and  as  the  two  governments  are  still  pursuing. 

Yet,  without  the  concurrence  of  the  two  states  whose  rights  are 
more  immediately  concerned,  both  having  an  interest  in  the  soil, 
and  one  of  them  in  the  jurisdiction  and  government,  the  duty  of 
this  government  will  be  to  adopt  no  new  course,  but,  in  compliance 
with  treaty  stipulations,  and  in  furtherance  of  what  has  already 
been  done,  to  hasten  the  pending  negotiations  as  fast  as  possible, 
in  the  course  hitherto  adopted. 

But  the  President  thinks  it  a  highly  desirable  object  to  prevent 
the  delays  necessarily  incident  to  any  settlement  of  the  question 
by  these  means.  Such  delays  are  great  and  unavoidable.  It  has 
been  found  that  an  exploration  and  examination  of  the  several  lines 
constitute  a  work  of  three  years.  The  existing  commission  for 
making  such  exploration,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States, 
has  been  occupied  two  summers,  and  a  very  considerable  portion 
of  the  work  remains  still  to  be  done.  If  a  joint  commission  should 
be  appointed,  and  should  go  through  the  same  work,  and  the  com 
missioners  should  disagree,  as  is  very  possible,  and  an  arbitration 
on  that  account  become  indispensable,  the  arbitrators  might  find  it 
necessary  to  make  an  exploration  and  survey  themselves,  or  cause 
the  same  to  be  done  by  others,  of  their  own  appointment.  If  to 
these  causes,  operating  to  postpone  the  final  decision,  be  added  the 
time  necessary  to  appoint  arbitrators,  and  for  their  preparation  to 
leave  Europe  for  the  service,  the  various  retarding  incidents  al- 


238  [66 

ways  attending  such  operation,  seven  or  eight  years  constitute, 
perhaps,  the  shortest  period  within  which  we  can  look  for  a  final 
result.  In  the  meantime,  great  expenses  have  been  incurred,  and 
further  expenses  cannot  be  avoided.  It  is  well  known  that  the  con 
troversy  has  brought  heavy  charges  upon  Maine  herself,  to  the  re 
muneration  or  proper  settlement  of  which  she  can  not  be  expected 
to  be  indifferent.  The  exploration  by  the  government  of  the  Unit 
ed  States  has  already  cost  a  hundred  thousand  dollars,  and  the 
charge  of  another  summer's  work  is  in  prospect.  These  facts  may 
be  sufficient  to  enable  us  to  form  a  probable  estimate  of  the  whole 
expense  likely  to  be  incurred  before  the  controversy  can  b"e  settled 
by  arbitration;  and  our  experience  admonishes  us  that  even  an 
other  arbitration  might  possibly  fail. 

The  opinion  of  this  government  upon  the  justice  and  validity  of 
the  American  claim  has  been  expressed  at  so  many  times,  and  in 
so  many  forms,  that  a  repetition  of  that  opinion  is  not  necessary. 
But  the  subject  is  a  subject  in  dispute.  The  government  has 
agreed  to  make  it  matter  of  reference  and  arbitration;  and  it  must 
fulfill  that  agreement,  unless  another  mode  for  settling  the  contro 
versy  should  be  resorted  to,  with  the  hope  of  producing  a  speedier 
decision.  The  President  proposes,  then,  that  the  governments  of 
Maine  and  Massachusetts  should  severally  appoint  a  commissioner 
or  commissioners,  empowered  to  confer  with  the  authorities  of  this 
government  upon  a  conventional  line,  or  line  by  agreement,  with 
its  terms,  conditions,  considerations,  and  equivalents;  with  an  un 
derstanding  that  no  such  line  will  be  agreed  upon  without  the  as 
sent  of  such  commissioners. 

This  mode  of  proceeding,  or  some  other  which  shall  express  as 
sent  beforehand,  seems  indispensable,  if  any  negotiation  for  a  con 
ventional  line  is  to  be  attempted;  since,  if  happily  a  treaty  should 
be  the  result  of  the  negotiation,  it  can  only  be  submitted  to  the 
Senate  of  the  United  States  for  ratification. 

It  is  a  subject  of  deep  and  sincere  regret  to  the  President  that 
the  British  plenipotentiary  did  not  arrive  in  the  country  and  make 
known  his  powers  in  time  to  have  made  this  communication  before 
the  annual  session  of  the  Legislature  of  the  two  states  had  been 
brought  to  a  close.  He  perceives  and  laments  the  inconvenience 
which  may  be  experienced  from  reassembling  those  legislatures. 
But  the  British  mission  is  a  special  one;  it  does  not  supersede  the 
resident  mission  of  the  British  government  at  Washington,  and  its 
stay  in  the  United  States  is  not  expected  to  be  long.  In  addition 
to  these  considerations,  it  is  to  be  suggested  that  more  than  four 
months  of  the  session  of  Congress  have  already  passed,  and  it  is 


67]  239 

highly  desirable,  if  any  treaty  for  a  conventional  line  should  be 
agreed  on,  that  it  should  be  concluded  before  the  session  shall  ter 
minate,  not  only  because  of  the  necessity  of  the  ratification  of  the 
Senate,  but  also  because  it  is  not  impossible  that  measures  may 
be  thought  advisable,  or  become  important,  which  can  only  be  ac 
complished  by  the  authority  of  both  Houses. 

These  considerations,  in  addition  to  the  importance  of  the  sub 
ject,  and  a  firm  conviction  in  the  mind  of  the  .President  that  the 
interests  of  both  countries,  as  well  as  the  interests  of  the  two 
states  more  immediately  concerned,  require  a  prompt  effort  to 
bring  this  dispute  to  an  end,  constrain  him  to  express  an  earnest 
hope  that  your  excellency  will  convene  the  Legislature  of  Maine, 
and  submit  the  subject  to  its  grave  and  candid  deliberations.  I 
am,  etc.,  DANIEL  WEBSTER. 

His  Excellency  John  Fairfield,  Governor  of  Maine. ' ' 

(4)  WEBSTER  TO  THE  MAINE  COMMISSIONERS. 

Washington,  July  15,  1842. 
Department  of  State,  Washington,  July  15,  1842. 

"Gentlemen, — You  have  had  an  opportunity  of  reading  Lord 
Ashburton's  note  to  me  of  the  llth  of  July.  Since  that  date  I 
have  had  full  and  frequent  conferences  with  him  respecting  the 
eastern  boundary,  and  believe  I  understand  what  is  practicable  to 
be  done  on  that  subject,  so  far  as  he  is  concerned.  In  these  con 
ferences  he  has  made  no  positive  or  binding  proposition,  thinking, 
perhaps,  it  would  be  more  desirable,  under  present  circumstances, 
that  such  proposition  should  proceed  from  the  side  of  the  United 
States.  I  have  reason  to  believe,  however,  that  he  would  agree 
to  a  line  of  boundary  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
provinces  of  Canada  and  New  Brunswick,  such  as  is  described  in 
a  paper  accompanying  this  (marked  B),  and  identified  by  my  sig 
nature.  ***** 

The  territory  in  dispute  between  the  two  countries  contains 
12,027  square  miles,  equal  to  7,697,280  acres. 

By  the  line  described  in  the  accompanying  paper,  there  will  be 
assigned  to  the  United  States  7015  square  miles,  equal  to  4,489,600 
acres;  and  to  England  5012  square  miles,  equal  to  3,207,680  acres. 

By  the  award  of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands,  there  was  as 
signed  to  the  United  States  7907  square  miles,  5,061,120  acres;  to 
England  4119  square  miles,  2,636,160  acres. 

The  territory  proposed  to  be  relinquished  to  England  south  of 
the  line  of  the  King  of  the  Netherlands  is,  as  you  will  see,  the 
mountain  range  from  the  upper  part  of  the  St.  Francis  Eiver  to 


240  [68 

the  meeting  of  the  two  contested  lines  of  boundary,  at  the  Metjar- 
mette  Portage,  in  the  highlands,  near  the  source  of  the  St.  John. 
This  mountain  tract  contains  893  square  miles,  equal  to  571,520 
acres.  It  is  supposed  to  be  of  no  value  for  cultivation  or  settle 
ment.  On  this  point  you  will  see  herewith  a  letter  from  Captain 
Talcott,  who  has  been  occupied  two  summers  in  exploring  tke  line 
of  the  highlands,  and  is  intimately  acquainted  with  the  territory. 
The  line  leaves  to  the  United  States,  between  the  base  of  the  hills 
and  the  left  bank  of  the  St.  John,  and  lying  upon  the  river,  a  ter 
ritory  of  657,280  acres,  embracing,  without  doubt,  all  the  valuable 
land  south  of  the  St.  Francis  and  west  of  the  St.  John.  Of  the 
general  division  of  the  territory,  it  is  believed  it  may  be  safely 
said,  that  while  the  portion  remaining  with  the  United  States  is, 
in  quantity,  seven-twelfths,  in  value  it  is  at  least  four-fifths  of  the 
whole. 

If  this  line  should  be  agreed  to  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
I  suppose  that  the  British  minister  would,  as  an  equivalent,  stip 
ulate,  first,  for  the  use  of  the  Elver  St.  John,  for  the  conveyance 
of  the  timber  growing  on  any  of  its  branches,  to  tide-water,  free 
from  all  discriminating  tolls,  impositions,  or  inabilities  of  any  kind, 
the  timber  enjoying  all  the  privileges  of  British  colonial  timber. 
All  opinions  concur  that  this  privilege  of  navigation  must  greatly 
enhance  the  value  of  the  territory  and  the  timber  growing  thereon, 
and  prove  exceedingly  useful  to  the  people  of  Maine.  Second: 
That  House's  Point,  in  Lake  Champlain,  and  the  lands  heretofore 
supposed  to  be  within  the  limits  of  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  and 
New  York,  but  which  a  correct  ascertainment  of  the  45th  parallel 
of  latitude  shows  to  be  in  Canada,  should  be  surrendered  to  the 
United  States. 

It  is  probable,  also,  that  the  disputed  line  of  boundary  in  Lake 
Superior  might  be  so  adjusted  as  to  leave  a  disputed  island  within 
the  United  States. 

These  cessions  on  the  part  of  England  would  enure  partly  to 
the  benefit  of  the  states  of  New  Hampshire,  Vermont,  and  New 
York,  but  principally  to  the  United  States.  The  consideration  on 
the  part  of  England,  for  making  them,  would  be  the  manner  agreed 
upon  for  adjusting  the  eastern  boundary.  The  price  of  the  cession, 
therefore,  whatever  it  might  be,  would  in  fairness  belong  to  the 
two  states  interested  in  the  manner  of  that  adjustment. 

Under  the  influence  of  these  considerations,  I  am  authorized  to 
say,  that  if  the  commissioners  of  the  two  states  assent  to  the  line 
as  described  in  the  accompanying  paper,  the  United  States  will 


69]  241 

undertake  to  pay  to  these  states  the  sum  of  two  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  dollars,  to  be  divided  between  them  in  equal  moieties; 
and  also  to  undertake  for  the  settlement  and  payment  of  the  ex 
penses  incurred  by  those  states  for  the  maintenance  of  the  civil 
posse,  and  also  for  a  survey  which  it  was  found  necessary  to  make. 
The  line  suggested,  with  the  compensations  and  equivalents 
which  have  been  stated,  is  now  submitted  for  your  consideration. 
That  it  is  all  which  might  have  been  hoped  for,  looking  to  the 
strength  of  the  American  claim,  can  hardly  be  said.  But,  as  the 
settlement  of  a  controversy  of  such  duration  is  a  matter  of  high 
importance,  as  equivalents  of  undoubted  value  are  offered,  as 
longer  postponement  and  delay  would  lead  to  further  inconven 
ience,  and  to  the  incurring  of  further  expenses,  and  as  no  better 
occasion,  or,  perhaps,  any  other  occasion,  for  settling  the  boundary 
by  agreement,  and  on  the  principle  of  equivalents,  is  ever  likely 
to  present  itself,  the  government  of  the  United  States  hopes  that 
the  commissioners  of  the  two  states  will  find  it  to  be  consistent 
with  their  duty  to  assent  to  the  line  proposed,  and  to  the  terms 
and  conditions  attending  the  proposition."  *  *  *  * 


(5)  LORD  ASHBURTON  TO  WEBSTER. 

Washington,  August  9,  1842. 

a. 

' '  Sir, — It  appears  desirable  that  some  explanation  between  us 
should  be  recorded  by  correspondence  respecting  the  fifth  article 
of  the  treaty  signed  by  us  this  day  for  the  settlement  of  bound 
aries  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 

By  that  article  of  the  treaty  it  is  stipulated  that  certain  pay 
ments  shall  be  made  by  the  government  of  the  United  States  to 
the  states  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts.  It  has,  of  course,  been 
understood  that  my  negotiations  have  been  with  the  government 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  introduction  of  terms  of  agreement 
between  the  general  government  and  the  states  would  have  been 
irregular  and  inadmissible,  if  it  had  not  been  deemed  expedient 
to  bring  the  whole  of  these  transactions  within  the  purview  of  the 
treaty.  There  may  not  be  wanting  analogous  cases  to  justify  this 
proceeding;  but  it  seems  proper  that  I  should  have  confirmed  by 
you  that  my  government  incurs  no  responsibility  for  these  engage 
ments,  of  the  precise  nature  and  object  of  which  I  am  unin 
formed,  nor  have  I  considered  it  necessary  to  make  inquiry  con 
cerning  them."  ***** 


242  [70 


"By  the  3d  article  of  the  convention  which  I  have  this  day 
signed  with  you,  there  is  an  agreement  for  the  reciprocal  delivery, 
in  certain  cases,  of  criminals  fugitive  from  justice;  but  it  becomes 
necessary  that  I  should  apprise  you  that  this  article  can  have  no 
legal  effect  within  the  dominions  of  Great  Britain  until  confirmed 
by  act  of  Parliament.  It  is  possible  that  Parliament  may  not  be 
in  session  before  the  exchange  of  the  ratifications  of  the  conven 
tion,  but  its  sanction  shall  be  asked  at  the  earliest  possible  period, 
and  no  doubt  can  be  entertained  that  it  will  be  given.  In  Her 
Majesty's  territories  in  Canada,  where  cases  for  acting  under  this 
convention  are  likely  to  be  of  more  frequent  occurrence,  the  gov 
ernor  general  has  sufficient  power,  under  the  authority  of  local 
legislation,  and  the  convention  will  there  be  acted  upon  so  soon 
as  its  ratification  shall  be  known;  but  it  becomes  my  duty  to  in 
form  you  of  the  short  delay  which  may  possibly  intervene  in  giv 
ing  full  effect  to  it  where  the  confirmation  by  Parliament  becomes 
necessary  for  its  execution.  '  '  *  *  * 

APPENDIX  B. 

The  treaty  concluded  at  Washington,  August  9,  1842,  by  Lord 
Ashburton  and  Daniel  Webster,  verbatim^ 

1  '  Whereas,  certain  portions  of  the  line  of  boundary  between  the 
United  States  of  America  and  the  British  dominions  in  North 
America,  described  in  the  second  article  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace 
of  1783,  have  not  yet  been  ascertained  and  determined,  notwith 
standing  the  repeated  attempts  which  have  been  heretofore  made 
for  that  purpose;  and  whereas  it  is  now  thought  to  be  for  the 
interest  of  both  parties,  that,  avoiding  further  discussion  of  their 
respective  rights,  arising  in  this  respect  under  the  said  treaty,  they 
should  agree  on  a  conventional  line  in  said  portions  of  the  said 
boundary,  such  as  may  be  convenient  to  both  parties,  with  such 
equivalents  and  compensations  as  are  deemed  just  and  reasonable; 
and  whereas,  by  the  treaty  concluded  at  Ghent,  on  the  24th  day 
of  December,  1814,  between  the  United  States  and  his  Britannic 
majesty,  an  article  was  agreed  to  and  inserted,  of  the  following 
tenor,  viz.:  'Article  10.  Whereas  the  traffic  in  slaves  is  irrecon 
cilable  with  the  principles  of  humanity  and  justice;  and  whereas 
both  his  majesty  and  the  United  States  are  desirous  of  continuing 
their  efforts  to  promote  its  entire  abolition,  it  is  hereby  agreed 


117  Treaties  and  Conventions,  J.  H.  Haswell,  pp.  432-438;   also  House  Ex 
ecutive  Documents,  27th  Cong.,  3rd  Sess.,  No.  2,  pp.  25-30. 


71]  243 

that  both  the  contracting  parties  shall  use  their  best  endeavors 
to  accomplish  so  desirable  an  object;'  and  whereas,  notwithstand 
ing  the  laws  which  have  at  various  times  been  passed  by  the  two 
governments,  and  the  efforts  made  to  suppress  it,  that  criminal 
traffic  is  still  prosecuted  and  carried  on;  and  whereas,  the  United 
States  of  America  and  her  majesty,  the  Queen  of  the  United  King 
dom  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  are  determined  that,  so  far  as 
may  be  in  their  power,  it  shall  be  effectually  abolished;  and  where 
as,  it  is  found  expedient  for  the  better  administration  of  justice 
and  the  prevention  of  crime  within  the  territories  and  jurisdiction 
of  the  two  parties  respectively,  that  persons  committing  the  crimes 
hereinafter  enumerated,  and  being  fugitives  from  justice,  should, 
under  certain  circumstances,  be  reciprocally  delivered  up:  The 
United  States  of  America  and  her  Britannic  Majesty,  having  re 
solved  to  treat  on  these  several  subjects,  have  for  that  purpose 
appointed  their  respective  Plenipotentiaries  to  negotiate  and  con 
clude  a  treaty;  that  is  to  say: 

The  President  of  the  United  States  has,  on  his  part,  furnished 
with  full  powers  Daniel  Webster,  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United 
States;  and  Her  Majesty,  the  Queen  of  the  United  Kingdom  of 
Great  Britain  and  Ireland  has,  on  her  part,  appointed  the  Eight 
Honorable  Alexander  Lord  Ashburton,  a  peer  of  the  said  United 
Kingdom,  a  member  of  Her  Majesty's  most  honorable  privy  counsel, 
and  Her  Majesty's  minister  plenipotentiary  on  a  special  mission  to 
the  United  States; 

Who,  after  a  reciprocal  communication  of  their  respective  full 
powers,  have  agreed  to  and  signed  the  following  articles: 

ARTICLE  I. 

It  is  hereby  agreed  and  declared  that  the  line  of  boundary  shall 
be  as  follows:  Beginning  at  the  monument  at  the  source  of  the 
Kiver  St.  Croix,  as  designated  and  agreed  to  by  the  commissioners 
under  the  fifth  article  of  the  treaty  of  1794,  between  the  govern 
ments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain;  thence  north,  fol 
lowing  the  exploring  line  run  and  marked  by  the  surveyors  of  the 
two  governments  in  the  years  1817  and  1818,  under  the  fifth  article 
of  the  Treaty  of  Ghent,  to  its  intersection  with  the  Kiver  St.  John, 
and  to  the  middle  of  the  channel  thereof;  thence,  up  the  middle  of 
the  main  channel  of  the  said  Kiver  St.  John  to  the  mouth  of  the 
River  St.  Francis;  thence  up  the  middle  of  the  channel  of  the  said 
Kiver  St.  Francis,  and  of  the  lakes  through  which  it  flows,  to  the 
outlet  of  the  Lake  Pohenagamook;  thence,  southwesterly,  in  a 
straight  line,  to  a  point  on  the  northwest  branch  of  the  River  St. 


244  [72 

John,  which  point  shall  be  ten  miles  distant  from  the  main  branch 
of  the  St.  John,  in  a  straight  line,  and  in  the  nearest  direction;  but 
if  the  said  point  shall  be  found  to  be  less  than  seven  miles  from 
the  nearest  point  of  the  summit,  or  crest,  of  the  Highlands  that 
divide  those  rivers  which  empty  themselves  into  the  Eiver  St. 
Lawrence  from  those  which  fall  into  the  Eiver  St.  John,  then  the 
said  point  shall  be  made  to  recede  down  the  said  northwest  branch 
of  the  Eiver  St.  John,  to  a  point  seven  miles  in  a  straight  line 
from  the  said  summit  or  crest;  thence  in  a  straight  line,  in  a  course 
about  south,  eight  degrees  west,  to  the  point  where  the  parallel  of 
latitude  of  46  degrees  25  minutes  north  intersects  the  southwest 
branch  of  the  St.  John's;  thence,  southerly,  by  the  said  branch, 
to  the  source  thereof  in  the  Highlands,  at  the  Metjarmette  Port 
age;  thence  down  along  the  said  Highlands  which  divide  the  waters 
which  empty  themselves  into  the  Eiver  St.  Lawrence  from  those 
which  fall  into  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  to  the  head  of  Hall's  Stream; 
thence  down  the  middle  of  said  stream,  till  the  line  thus  run  inter 
sects  the  old  line  of  boundary  surveyed  and  marked  by  Valentine 
and  Collins  previously  to  the  year  1774,  as  the  45th  degree  of  north 
latitude,  and  which  has  been  known  and  understood  to  be  the  line 
of  actual  division  between  the  States  of  New  York  and  Vermont 
on  one  side,  and  the  British  province  of  Canada  on  the  other;  and 
from  said  point  of  intersection,  west,  along  the  said  dividing-line, 
as  heretofore  known  and  understood,  to  the  Iroquois  or  St.  Law 
rence  Eiver. 

ARTICLE  II. 

It  is  moreover  agreed,  that  from  the  place  where  the  joint  com 
missioners  terminated  their  labors  under  the  sixth  article  of  the 
Treaty  of  Ghent,  to  wit,  at  a  point  in  the  Neebish  Channel,  near 
Muddy  Lake,  the  line  shall  run  into  and  along  the  ship-channel 
between  St.  Joseph's  and  St.  Tammany  Islands,  to  the  division  of 
the  channel  at  or  near  the  head  of  St.  Joseph's  Island;  thence, 
turning  eastwardly  and  northwardly,  around  the  lower  end  of  St. 
George's  or  Sugar  Island,  and  following  the  middle  of  the  channel 
which  divides  St.  George's  from  St.  Joseph's  Island;  thence  up  the 
east  Neebish  Channel,  nearest  to  St.  George's  Island,  through  the 
middle  of  Lake  George;  thence,  west  of  Jonas 's  Island,  into  St. 
Mary's  Eiver,  to  a  point  in  the  middle  of  that  river,  about  one 
mile  above  St.  George's  or  Sugar  Island,  so  as  to  appropriate  and 
assign  the  said  island  to  the  United  States;  thence,  adopting  the 
line  traced  on  the  maps  by  the  commissioners,  through  the  Eiver 
St.  Mary  and  Lake  Superior,  to  a  point  north  of  He  Eoyale,  in 


73]  245 

said  lake,  one  hundred  yards  to  the  north  and  east  of  He  Chapeu, 
which  last-mentioned  island  lies  near  the  northeastern  point  of  He 
Eoyale,  where  the  line  marked  by  the  commissioners  terminates; 
and  from  the  last-mentioned  point,  southwesterly,  through  the  mid 
dle  of  the  sound  between  He  Eoyale  and  the  northwestern  main 
land,  to  the  mouth  of  Pigeon  Eiver,  and  up  the  said  river  to  and 
through  the  north  and  south  Fowl  Lakes  to  the  lakes  of  the  height 
of  land  between  Lake  Superior  and  the  Lake  of  the  Woods;  thence 
along  the  water  communication  to  Lake  Saisaginaga,  and  through 
that  Lake;  thence  to  and  through  Cypress  Lake,  Lac  du  Bois 
Blanc,  Lac  la  Croix,  Little  Vermillion  Lake,  and  Lake  Namecan, 
and  through  the  several  smaller  lakes,  straits,  or  streams  connect 
ing  the  lakes  here  mentioned,  to  that  point  in  Lac  la  Pluie,  or 
Eainy  Lake,  at  the  Chaudiere  Falls,  from  which  the  commissioners 
traced  the  line  to  the  most  northwestern  point  of  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods;  thence  along  the  said  line  to  the  said  most  northwestern 
point,  being  in  latitude  49  degrees,  23  minutes,  55  seconds  north, 
and  in  longitude  95  degrees,  14  minutes,  38  seconds  west  from  the 
observatory  at  Greenwich;  thence,  according  to  existing  treaties, 
due  south,  to  its  intersection  with  the  49th  parallel  of  north  lati 
tude,  and  along  that  parallel  to  the  Eocky  Mountains;  it  being 
understood  that  all  the  water  communications,  and  all  the  usual 
portages  along  the  line  from  Lake  Superior  to  the  Lake  of  the 
Woods  and  also  Grand  Portage,  from  the  shore  of  Lake  Superior 
to  the  Pigeon  Elver,  as  now  actually  used,  shall  be  free  and  open 
to  the  use  of  the  citizens  and  subjects  of  both  countries. 

ARTICLE  III. 

In  order  to  promote  the  interests  and  encourage  the  industry 
of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  countries  watered  by  the  Eiver  St. 
John  and  its  tributaries,  whether  living  within  the  State  of  Maine 
or  the  province  of  New  Brunswick,  it  is  agreed  that  where,  by 
the  provisions  of  the  present  treaty,  the  Eiver  St.  John  is  de 
clared  to  be  the  line  of  boundary,  the  navigation  of  the  said  river 
shall  be  free  and  open  to  both  parties  and  shall  in  no  way  be 
obstructed  by  either;  that  all  the  produce  of  the  forest  in  logs, 
lumber,  timber,  boards,  staves,  or  shingles,  or  of  agriculture,  not 
being  manufactured,  grown  on  any  of  those  parts  of  the  State  of 
Maine  watered  by  the  Elver  St.  John,  or  by  its  tributaries,  of 
which  fact  reasonable  evidence  shall,  if  required,  be  produced, 
shall  have  free  access  into  and  through  the  said  river  and  its  said 
tributaries,  having  their  source  within  the  State  of  Maine,  to  and 
from  the  sea-port  at  the  mouth  of  the  said  Eiver  St.  John's,  and  to 
and  round  the  falls  of  the  said  river,  either  by  boats,  rafts,  or  other 


246  [74 

conveyance;  that  when  within  the  province  of  New  Brunswick,  the 
said  produce  shall  be  dealt  with  as  if  it  were  the  produce  of  the 
said  province;  that  in  like  manner,  the  inhabitants  of  the  terri 
tory  of  the  Upper  St.  John,  determined  by  this  treaty  to  belong 
to  her  Britannic  majesty,  shall  have  free  access  to  and  through  the 
river  for  their  produce,  in  those  parts  where  the  said  river  runs 
wholly  through  the  State  of  Maine:  Provided  always,  that  this 
agreement  shall  give  no  right  to  either  party  to  interfere  with 
any  regulations  not  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  treaty 
which  the  governments,  respectively,  of  Maine  or  of  New  Bruns 
wick  may  make  respecting  the  navigation  of  the  said  river,  where 
both  banks  thereof  shall  belong  to  the  same  party. 

ARTICLE  IV. 

All  grants  of  land  heretofore  made  by  either  party,  within  the 
limits  of  the  territory  which  by  this  treaty  falls  within  the  do 
minions  of  the  other  party,  shall  be  held  valid,  ratified,  and  con 
firmed  to  the  persons  in  possession  under  such  grants,  to  the  same 
extent  as  if  such  territory  had  by  this  treaty  fallen  within  the 
dominions  of  the  party  by  whom  such  grants  were  made:  and  all 
equitable  possessory  claims,  arising  from  a  possession  and  improve 
ment  of  any  lot  or  parcel  of  land  by  the  person  actually  in  pos 
session,  or  by  those  under  whom  such  person  claims,  for  more  than 
six  years  before  the  date  of  this  treaty,  shall,  in  like  manner,  be 
deemed  valid,  and  be  confirmed  and  quieted  by  a  release  to  the 
person  entitled  thereto,  of  the  title  to  such  lot  or  parcel  of  land, 
so  described  as  best  to  include  the  improvements  made  thereon; 
'and  in  all  other  respects  the  two  contracting  parties  agree  to  deal 
upon  the  most  liberal  principles  of  equity  with  the  settlers  actual 
ly  dwelling  upon  the  territory  falling  to  them,  respectively,  which 
has  heretofore  been  in  dispute  between  them. 

ARTICLE  V. 

Whereas,  in  the  course  of  the  controversy  respecting  the  dis 
puted  territory  on  the  northeastern  boundary,  some  moneys  have 
been  received  by  the  authorities  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  prov 
ince  of  New  Brunswick,  with  the  intention  of  preventing  depreda 
tions  on  the  forests  of  the  said  territory,  which  moneys  were  to  be 
carried  to  a  fund,  called  the  "disputed  territory  fund,"  the  pro 
ceeds  whereof,  it  was  agreed,  should  be  hereafter  paid  over  to  the 
parties  interested,  in  the  proportions  to  be  determined  by  a  final 
settlement  of  boundaries:  it  is  hereby  agreed  that  a  correct  ac 
count  of  all  receipts  and  payments  on  the  said  fund  shall  be  de- 


75]  247 

livered  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  within  six  months 
after  the  ratification  of  this  treaty;  and  the  proportion  of  the 
amount  due  thereon  to  the  States  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts, 
and  any  bonds  or  securities  appertaining  thereto,  shall  be  paid  and 
delivered  over  to  the  Government  of  the  United  States;  and  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  agrees  to  receive  for  the  use  of 
and  pay  over  to,  the  States  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  their 
respective  portions  of  said  fund;  and  further,  to  pay  and  satisfy 
said  states,  respectively,  for  all  claims  for  expenses  incurred  by 
them  in  protecting  the  said  heretofore  disputed  territory,  and  mak 
ing  a  survey  thereof  in  1838;  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
agreeing  with  the  States  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts  to  pay  them 
the  further  sum  of  three  hundred  thousand  dollars,  in  equal  moieties, 
on  account  of  their  assent  to  the  line  of  boundary  described  in  this 
treaty,  and  in  consideration  of  the  conditions  and  equivalents  re 
ceived  therefor,  from  the  government  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty. 

ARTICLE  VI. 

It  is  furthermore  understood  and  agreed,  that  for  the  purpose  of 
running  and  tracing  those  parts  of  the  line  between  the  source  of 
the  St.  Croix  and  the  St.  Lawrence  Eiver,  which  will  require  to  be 
run  and  ascertained,  and  for  marking  the  residue  of  said  line  by 
proper  monuments  on  the  land,  two  commissioners  shall  be  ap 
pointed,  one  by  the  President  of  the  United  States,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  thereof,  and  one  by  Her  Bri 
tannic  Majesty;  and  the  said  commissioners  shall  meet  at  Bangor, 
in  the  State  of  Maine,  on  the  first  day  of  May  next,  or  as  soon 
thereafter  as  may  be,  and  shall  proceed  to  mark  the  line  above 
described,  from  the  source  of  the  St.  Croix  to  the  Eiver  St.  John; 
and  shall  trace  on  proper  maps  the  dividing  line  along  said  river 
and  along  the  River  St.  Francis  to  the  outlet  of  the  Lake  Pohe- 
nagamook;  and  from  the  outlet  of  the  said  lake  they  shall  ascer 
tain,  fix,  and  mark,  by  proper  and  durable  monuments  on  the  land, 
the  line  described  in  the  first  article  of  this  treaty;  and  the  said 
commissioners  shall  make  to  each  of  their  respective  Governments 
a  joint  report  or  declaration,  under  their  hands  and  seals,  desig 
nating  such  line  of  boundary,  and  shall  accompany  such  report  er 
declaration  with  maps  certified  by  them  to  be  true  maps  of  the  new 
boundary. 

ARTICLE  VII. 

It  is  further  agreed  that  the  channels  in  the  Elver  St.  Law 
rence  on  both  sides  of  the  Long  Sault  Islands  and  of  Barnhart 
Island,  the  channels  in  the  Eiver  Detroit,  on  both  sides  of  the 


248  [76 

Island  Bois  Blanc,  and  between  that  island  and  both  the  American 
and  Canadian  shores,  and  all  the  several  channels  and  passages 
between  the  various  islands  lying  near  the  junction  of  the  Eiver 
St.  Glair  with  the  lake  of  that  name,  shall  be  equally  free  and  open 
to  the  ships,  vessels,  and  boats  of  both  parties. 

ARTICLE  VIII. 

The  parties  mutually  stipulate  that  each  shall  prepare,  equip, 
and  maintain  in  service,  on  the  coast  of  Africa,  a  sufficient  and 
adequate  squadron  or  naval  force  of  vessels  of  suitable  numbers 
and  descriptions,  to  carry  in  all  not  less  than  eighty  guns,  to 
enforce,  separately  and  respectively,  the  laws,  rights,  and  obliga 
tions  of  each  of  the  two  countries,  for  the  suppression  of  the  slave 
trade,  the  said  squadrons  to  be  independent  of  each  other,  but  the 
two  Governments  stipulating,  nevertheless,  to  give  such  orders  to 
the  officers  commanding  their  respective  forces,  as  shall  enable 
them  most  effectually  to  act  in  concert  and  cooperation,  upon 
mutual  consultation,  as  exigencies  may  arise,  for  the  attainment  of 
the  true  object  of  this  article;  copies  of  all  such  orders  to  be  com 
municated  by  each  government  to  the  other,  respectively. 

ARTICLE  IX. 

Whereas,  notwithstanding  all  efforts  which  may  be  made  on 
the  coast  of  Africa  for  suppressing  the  slave  trade,  the  facilities 
for  carrying  on  that  traffic  and  avoiding  the  vigilance  of  cruisers, 
by  the  fraudulent  use  of  flags  and  other  means,  are  so  great,  and 
the  temptations  for  pursuing  it,  while  a  market  can  be  found  for 
slaves,  so  strong,  as  that  the  desired  result  may  be  long  delayed, 
unless  all  markets  be  shut  against  the  purchase  of  African  negroes, 
the  parties  to  this  treaty  agree  that  they  will  unite  in  all  becoming 
representations  and  remonstrances  with  any  and  all  Powers  within 
whose  dominions  such  markets  are  allowed  to  exist,  and  that  they 
will  urge  upon  all  such  Powers  the  propriety  and  duty  of  closing 
such  markets  effectually,  at  once  and  forever. 

ARTICLE  X. 

It  is  agreed  that  the  United  States  and  Her  Britannic  Majesty 
shall,  upon  mutual  requisitions  by  them,  or  their  Ministers,  officers, 
or  authorities,  respectively  made,  deliver  up  to  justice  all  persons 
who,  being  charged  with  the  crime  of  murder,  or  assault  with 
intent  to  commit  murder,  or  piracy,  or  arson,  or  robbery,  or  forg 
ery,  or  the  utterance  of  forged  papers,  committed  within  the  juris 
diction  of  either,  shall  seek  an  asylum  or  shall  be  found  within  the 


77]  249 

territories  of  the  other:  Provided,  that  this  shall  only  be  done  upon 
such  evidence  of  criminality  as,  according  to  the  laws  of  the  place 
where  the  fugitive  or  person  so  charged  shall  be  found,  would 
justify  his  apprehension  and  commitment  for  trial  if  the  crime 
or  offense  had  there  been  committed;  and  the  respective  judges 
and  other  magistrates  of  the  two  governments  shall  have  power, 
jurisdiction,  and  authority,  upon  complaint  made  under  oath,  to 
issue  a  warrant  for  the  apprehension  of  the  fugitive  or  person  so 
charged,  that  he  may  be  brought  before  such  judges  or  other  mag 
istrates,  respectively,  to  the  end  that  the  evidence  of  criminality 
may  be  heard  and  considered;  and  if,  on  such  hearing,  the  evidence 
be  deemed  sufficient  to  sustain  the  charge,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of 
the  examining  judge  or  magistrate  to  certify  the  same  to  the  proper 
executive  authority,  that  a  warrant  may  issue  for  the  surrender  of 
such  fugitive.  The  expense  of  such  apprehension  and  delivery 
shall  be  borne  and  defrayed  by  the  party  who  makes  the  requi 
sition  and  receives  the  fugitive. 

ARTICLE  XI. 

The  eighth  article  of  this  treaty  shall  be  in  force  for  five  years 
from  the  date  of  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  and  afterward  until 
one  or  the  other  party  shall  signify  a  wish  to  terminate  it.  The 
tenth  article  shall  continue  in  force  until  one  or  the  other  of  the 
parties  shall  signify  its  wish  to  terminate  it,  and  no  longer. 

ARTICLE  XII. 

The  present  treaty  shall  be  duly  ratified,  and  the  mutual  ex 
change  shall  take  place  in  London,  within  six  months  from  the  date 
hereof,  or  earlier,  if  possible. 

In  faith  whereof,  we,  the  respective  Plenipotentiaries,  have 
signed  this  treaty,  and  have  hereunto  affixed  our  seals. 

Done  in  duplicate  at  Washington,  the  ninth  day  of  August, 
anno  Domini  one  thousand  eight  hundred  and  forty-two. 

DANL.  WEBSTER  (Seal). 
ASHBURTON  (Seal). 

APPENDIX  C. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  WEBSTER'S  PRIVATE  CORRESPONDENCE. 

(1)  Webster  to  Edward  Everett,  Washington,  June  28,  1842. 

(2)  Lord  Ashburton  to  Webster,  The  Grange,  January  2,  1843, 

(3)  Lord  Ashburton  to  Webster,  London,  April  28,  1844. 


250  [78 

(1)  WEBSTER  TO  EDWARD  EVERETT,  WASHINGTON,  JUNE  28,  1842. 

' '  Our  movement  for  the  last  ten  days,  if  any  has  been  made, 
has  been  rather  backward.  The  boundary  business  is  by  no  means 
in  a  highly  promising  state — so  many  difficulties  arise,  not  only 
between  us  and  England,  but  between  us  and  the  commissioners, 
and  the  commissioners  of  the  two  States  themselves — and  other 
questions  are  still  less  so.  I  know  nothing  of  Lord  Ashburton's 
recent  instructions,  but  he  appears  to  me,  certainly,  to  be  under 
restraints  not  heretofore  apparently  felt  by  him.  What  increases 
the  embarrassment  and  renders  a  failure  more  probable,  is  his 
great  unwillingness  to  stay  longer  in  the  country.  The  President 
has  desired  a  personal  interview  with  him,  which  has  been  had,  and 
the  President  has  pressed  upon  him  in  the  strongest  manner  the 
necessity  of  staying  till  every  effort  to  effect  the  great  object  of 
his  mission  shall  have  been  exhausted.  The  President  feels,  what 
all  must  feel,  that  if  the  mission  should  return,  rebus  infectis,  the 
relations  of  the  two  countries  will  be  more  than  ever  embarrassed. 

"I  think  we  have  much  reason  to  regret,  if  not  some  right  to 
complain,  that,  in  regard  to  the  delicate  questions  growing  out  of 
such  cases  as  that  of  the  Creole,  we  have  been  strangely  mis 
understood.  The  Lords  took  up  the  subject  of  the  Creole,  appar 
ently  with  no  accurate  knowledge  of  what  had  been  done  or  said 
by  us,  and  argued  and  decided  questions  which  we  had  never  raised 
or  thought  of  raising,  and  that  misapprehension  seems  to  have  run 
through  all  subsequent  considerations  of  the  subject.  We  did  not 
make  any  demand  for  fugitive  slaves;  no  such  thing;  we  well 
know  that  when  slaves  get  on  British  ground,  they  are  free.  Nor 
have  we  ever  asked  England  to  enter  into  any  stipulation  by  treaty 
which  should  interfere  with  this  general  principle  of  English  law. 
Nor  do  we,  in  the  absence  of  treaty  provisions,  demand  the  sur 
render  of  fugitives  from  justice.  You  quote  Lord  Aberdeen  as 
saying,  'You  do  not  yourselves  give  up  mutineers  to  be  punished.' 
Certainly  we  do  not,  nor  do  we  surrender  other  offenders,  unless  in 
virtue  of  special  stipulations  by  treaty.  But  we  think  a  proper 
convention  for  the  extradition  of  offenders  charged  with  high 
crimes  would  tend  greatly  to  prevent  the  commission  of  such 
crimes,  and  to  preserve  peace  and  harmony  between  the  two  coun 
tries.  Such  a  provision  would  have  nothing  in  it  peculiarly  ad 
vantageous  to  the  United  States.  Its  benefits  would  be  equal  and 
alike  to  both  parties.  All  along  the  inland  frontier  the  necessity 
for  some  mutual  regulation  of  this  kind  is  severely  felt,  and  cases 
calling  for  such  regulations  are  also  constantly  arising  on  the  high- 


But  at  any  rate  we  wish  to  be  distinctly  understood,  and  I  repeat, 


79]  251 

therefore,  that  we  do  not  demand  the  restitution  of  fugitive  slaves; 
that,  without  treaty  stipulations  to  that  effect,  we  do  not  demand, 
and  shall  not  demand,  the  surrender  of  criminals  fleeing  from 
justice.  But  all  this  is  quite  remote  from  what  we  firmly  hold  to 
be  our  rights,  according  to  the  laws  and  usages  of  nations  in  such 
cases  as  that  of  the  Creole.  That  is  to  say  (that  in  cases  of  ves 
sels  carried  into  British  ports  by  violence  or  stress  of  weather,  we 
insist  that  there  shall  be  no  interference  from  the  land,  with  the 
relation  or  personal  condition  of  those  on  board,  according  to  the 
laws  of  their  own  country;  that  vessels  under  such  circumstances 
shall  enjoy  the  common  laws  of  hospitality,  subjected  to  no  force, 
entitled  to  have  their  immediate  wants  and  necessities  relieved, 
and  to  pursue  their  voyage  without  molestation).  *  *  * 

"A  general  feeling  prevails  in  this  country  at  the  present 
moment,  no  doubt,  both  North  and  South,  that  all  questions  will 
be  amicably  settled  through  the  agency  of  Lord  Ashburton 's  mis 
sion.  His  lordship's  frank  and  candid  manner,  his  great  intelli 
gence  and  practical  ability,  and  the  apparent  justness  and  moder 
ation  of  his  views  and  principles,  have  conspired  to  conduct  the 
public  mind  to  this  conclusion,  and  that  public  mind  desires  that 
result,  and  the  country  is  preparing  itself  for  the  state  of  things 
which  will  naturally  follow  it.  But  if  the  negotiation  fail,  if 
unexpected  obstacles  be  interposed,  if  what  has  been  considered 
quite  reasonable  and  moderate  be  not  attained,  if  the  boundary 
question  to  put  into  another  endless  series  of  surveys,  explorations, 
arbitrations,  and  umpirages,  if  we  are  left  only  to  understand  that 
our  coasting  trade  through  the  Bahama  Channel  can  not  otherwise 
enjoy  ordinary  safety  than  as  we  put  it  under  convoy,  a  mission, 
the  institution  of  which  was  hailed  as  a  bright  harbinger  of  the 
restoration  of  perfect  amity  and  harmony  between  the  two  coun 
tries,  and  in  the  conduct  of  which  I  am  sure  the  best  disposition 
has  prevailed,  will  only  have  terminated  in  leaving  things  much 
worse  than  it  found  them.  I  hardly  see  how  this  bad  result  is  to 
be  prevented,  unless  we  can  succeed  in  beseeching  Lord  Ashburton 
to  delay  his  return  another  month,  in  the  hope  that  the  cloud  on 
his  brow  may  be  dissipated  by  the  next  communication  from  home. 

"I  have  marked  this  letter  private,  as  it  is  in  answer  to  a 
private  letter  of  yours;  but  the  substance  and  effect  of  it  ought, 
perhaps,  be  made  known  to  Lord  Aberdeen;  notwithstanding  that 
his  lordship  may  receive  communications  from  Lord  Ashburton, 
covering  similar  accounts  of  the  sentiments  entertained  here,  and 
the  state  of  things  existing. 

"I  am,  dear  sir,  always  faithfully  yours, 

"T>.  WEBSTER." 


252  [80 

(2)  LORD  ASHBURTON  TO  WEBSTER,  THE  GRANGE,  JANUARY  2,  1843. 

*  "But  early  next  month  we  are  again  all  to  meet  in 
the  great  Babylon,  where  the  conflict  of  parties  in  our  Congress  is 
to  begin.  I  should  probably  not  appear  if  it  were  not  to  look 
after  my  dear  character  when  the  critics  open  their  attack  upon 
what  they  call  the  "Ashburton  Capitulation."  I  am  not  afraid 
of  them,  and  though  I  have  not  your  power  of  destroying  an  ad 
versary,  I  have  one  advantage  over  you,  that  I  have  a  right  to  be 
heard.  In  speaking  of  critics,  however,  I  should,  in  fairness,  state 
that  they  are  nearly,  if  not  exclusively,  reduced  to  one,  an  ex- 
Secretary  of  State,  who  is  laboring  hard  in  his  vocation  of  a  fault 
finding  leader  of  opposition,  sharpened  a  little  by  the  apprehension 
that  his  powers  of  diplomacy  are  questioned  by  the  result.  Mr. 
Everett,  who  has  been  passing  a  few  days  here  with  his  family, 
will  have  told  you  that  the  public  opinion  of  this  country  is  de 
cidedly  satisfied.  I  have  assurances  to  this  effect  from  people  of 
all  parties.  Few,  if  any,  of  the  Whigs  will  support  the  author  of 
the  angry  articles  of  The  Morning  Chronicle,  and  I  suspect  that 
when  it  comes  to  the  point  his  'capitulation'  will  be  more  mani 
fest  than  mine.  The  truth  is,  that  the  desire  of  all  here  is  peace, 
and  more  especially  with  your  country.  Nobody  of  common  sense 
cares  much  about  the  precise  position  of  Lake  Pohenagamook. 
The  important  thing  is  that  we  have  shaken  hands  cordially,  and 
I  should  be  very  sorry  to  be  supposed  to  have  ever  been  anxious  to 
make  a  sharp  bargain.  The  real  merit  of  the  settlement  is  that 
it  will  not  stand  this  description.  On  the  other  side,  what  we  may, 
I  believe,  really  boast  of,  my  dear  sir,  is  that  we  have  done  a 
work  of  peace  which  to  the  extent  of  our  power,  we  must  endeavor 
to  prevent  folly  or  malevolence  from  spoiling.  This  was  the  whole 
of  my  aim  in  crossing  the  Atlantic,  though  I  see  my  friend  Mr. 
Ingersoll  persists  that  I  want  to  be  an  earl  or  a  marquis,  with  a 
true  republican  appreciation  of  such  vanities. ' ' 

(3)  LORD  ASHBURTON  TO  WEBSTER,  LONDON,  APRIL  28,  1844. 


"On  this  side  of  the  water  the  several  debatable  subjects  con 
nected  with  our  treaty  are  settling  down  very  satisfactorily  in  the 
public  mind.  The  battle  of  the  maps,  the  question  whether  con 
cessions  were  made  on  either  side,  and  by  whom,  with  respect  to 
search  or  visit,  and  the  admirable  reproofs  administered  by  you 

to   the   officious   interference   of  Mr.  .     The   discussion   of   all 

these  questions,  now  pretty  nearly  exhausted,  leave  the  universal 
impression  that  the  treaty  was  a  good  and  wise  measure,  and  good 


81]  253 

and  wise  because  it  was  fair;  so  much  so  that  the  critics  are  at  a 
loss  to  determine  which  of  us  had  the  advantage  in  the  scramble 
for  the  swamps  on  the  St.  John's,  a  dilemma  in  which  it  was  your 
wish,  as  I  am  sure  it  was  mine,  to  leave  them.  The  map  question 
now  fortunately  only  interests  historians,  such  as  Mr.  Sparks  and 
Mr.  Bancroft.  I  am  by  no  means  disposed  to  disturb  its  sleep, 
or  that  either  party  should  find,  or  think  they  had  found,  anything 
conclusive,  so  as  to  interfere  with  the  conviction  that  there  existed 
that  real  shade  of  doubt  or  perplexity  which  could  alone  be  satis 
factorily  settled  by  compromise.  If  we  are  ever  fated  to  meet 
again,  which  I  indulge  the  hope  may  yet  be  the  case,  I  should  have 
some  curiosity  to  know  how  you  unravel  this,  to  me,  inextricable 
puzzle;  at  present  I  will  only  say,  what  I  know  you  will  believe, 
that  the  discoveries  here  are  quite  recent,  and  were  wholly  un 
known  to  me  when  I  was  at  Washington.  Not  but  that  I  agree 
entirely  with  you,  that  it  would  have  been  no  duty  of  mine  to 
damage  the  cause  of  my  client,  yet  at  the  same  time  I  perhaps 
went  further  in  protestations  of  ignorance  than  I  otherwise  should 
have  done.  Palmerston  has  in  Parliament  been  the  only  real  ad 
versary  of  the  treaty,  and  it  seems  felt  that  he  is  not  a  disinter 
ested  one.  His  move  will  probably  bring  upon  me  the  unusual 
honor  of  the  complimentary  acknowledgment  of  my  services.  That 
in  the  Lords  is  already  passed  with  only  three  dissentient  voices. 
In  the  Commons,  the  motion  is  expected  to  come  on  next  week. 
The  ministers  have  taken  no  part  in  this  volunteer  proceeding.  I 
send  you  herewith  Brougham's  speech,  which  is,  I  am  told,  good; 
but  you  will  be  surprised  when  I  add  that  I  have  not  yet  read  it. 
The  extradition  article  of  the  treaty  makes  some  stir  with  our 
anti-slavery  people.  I  have  seen  some  of  their  deputations,  and 
I  hope  to  have  satisfied  them;  but  we  shall  hear  of  them,  though 
with  no  bad  consequences,  when  the  bill  passes  for  giving  effect 
to  this  article.  The  apprehension  is  that  some  cases  of  robbery 
will  be  got  up  to  claim  fugitive  slaves.  This  will  certainly  require 
caution  with  the  magistrates  in  Canada,  but  I  am  not  fearful  of 
the  result;  but  should  the  abuse  prove  excessive,  the  remedy  is  in 
the  power  to  correct  the  article.  We  have  now  in  our  new  governor- 
general  a  very  judicious,  discreet,  and  liberal  man,  upon  whose 
practical  good  sense  full  reliance  may  be  placed. " 

APPENDIX  D. 

A  map  showing  the  various  lines  between  the  United  States  and 
the  British  provinces. 


254  [82 


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